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1Introduction
This thesis studies investment decisions. The theory of financial decision
making considers investors who allocate capital in an environment that is un-
certain by definition. In mainstream finance, people’s attitude toward uncer-
tainty has been modeled in terms of risk aversion. Put informally, risk aver-
sion means that if several investments have the same expected return/pay-off,
the one with the smallest variation in the outcome is preferred. To model
risk aversion for optimal decision making, one usually models the objective
for an investor as a concave utility function in terms of total wealth. For such
functions the main results are known since long, see the overview in Merton
(1990) and Ingersoll (1987). For three different appearances of risk aversion,
the fraction of initial capital that is invested in a risky asset is either decreas-
ing, constant, or increasing in the initial wealth of the investor. Since these
results were established, utility functions that show hyperbolic risk aversion
have dominated the finance literature. Such functions are mathematically
convenient.
There are, however, serious problems with these classical utility functions.
First, there is little empirical evidence that people have preferences that can
be modeled realistically with such functions. Although the idea of risk aver-
sion is appealing and not necessarily untrue, the popular choice of utility
function seems more motivated from a mathematical point than from the
point of realism. Second, from the area of behavioral psychology there has
emerged a concrete view on how people evaluate outcomes of financial deci-
sion. This is not compatible with the traditional way of modeling preferences
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in economics. Consistently, people seem to value outcomes not in terms of
their total financial wealth, but rather in terms of changes with respect to
their current situation. Coupled with an aversion against negative changes,
such attitudes can be characterized with the term loss aversion. The basic
psychology book of Gleitman et al. (2000) has the following definition:
“Loss Aversion: A widespread pattern, evident in many aspects
of decision making, in which people seem particularly sensitive to
losses and eager to avoid them.”
This thesis is about financial decision making when investors are loss-averse.
We provide new results and insights on the implied relation between wealth
and risk-taking, applied to different areas of finance.
1.1 Loss aversion
Although it is a well-known and widespread pattern, research analyzing the
effect of loss aversion in all aspects of finance and financial decision making
has only just started. With respect to financial decision making, loss aver-
sion is actively studied in two particular areas of finance. The first area is
that of behavioral finance, which concentrates on behavioral phenomena in
experimental and empirical (real-life) settings of financial decision-making.
The second is the area of Asset/Liability Management and risk management,
where loss aversion is used implicitly through downside risk measures.
Behavioral finance
Behavioral finance is rooted in experimental work regarding the estimation of
preferences by performing laboratory experiments. From these experiments,
many of the assumptions in the classical framework on utility functions, ex-
pected utility maximization, and rationality were very soon found to be in-
valid.1 An important article is that of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Based
on insights from behavioral psychology they propose a decision framework
called ‘prospect theory’ in which
  value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to absolute wealth
levels, and
  probabilities are replaced by decision weights.
1See Rabin (2002) for an extensive critique on classical economic theory and it’s failure
to incorporate established behavioral insights.
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Although both elements of prospect theory were not new at the time,
Kahneman and Tversky were the first to integrate them in a framework for
decision making under risk. Besides necessary extensions, Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992) estimate parameter values for a value- and weighting function.
Especially at the end of the 1980s much research has been published on
how people actually behave when faced with a decision situation involving
an uncertain outcome. It is important to note that the effects modeled by
Kahneman and Tversky are systematic. Given their systematic nature, the
results need to be taken into account by any economist modeling risk-taking
behavior.
In this thesis we do not consider the part of prospect theory that replaces
probabilities by subjective decision weights. We represent loss aversion in
its simplest form: if an outcome is above the reference point, its subjective
value equals the monetary value of the outcome. Outcomes below the refer-
ence point are multiplied by a constant penalty that represents the degree
of loss aversion. In a setting with uncertainty, our objective function can
be called mean-shortfall, as it maximizes average (mean) wealth, penalizing
expected shortfall below a reference point.
The empirical side of behavioral finance studies real-life economic be-
havior, applying behavioral insights to improve understanding of empirical
phenomena. However, contrary to our approach of focusing on one par-
ticular preference structure, most empirical research considers a number of
behavioral insights at the same time. For example, when evidence for loss
aversion in buy and sell behavior of stocks is studied in Shefrin and Statman
(1985), the existence of mental accounts is considered simultaneously. In the
same way, other research integrates loss aversion with overconfidence, or with
over- and under-reaction to information. See for example Shleifer (2000) for
an extensive study of behavioral finance in relation to the efficient market
hypothesis. Hirshleifer (2001) presents a survey of investor psychology in re-
lation to security prices. There are many behavioral phenomena to consider
and to integrate with loss aversion. However, the result is that it remains
unclear until now what the sole effect of loss-averse preferences is on decision
making.
Rationality
Most behavioral phenomena can be considered cognitive biases. Cognitive
biases are by definition irrational. Other than reading a book on the subject,
e.g., Kahneman et al. (1982), most of us do not consciously know that we
posses them. As such, integrating (irrational) biases with loss aversion sug-
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gests that loss aversion is also an irrational bias. This is clearly not the case.
In general, people actively express loss-averse attitudes. This suggests that
most of us are rationally aware that our aversion to losses is stronger than
our liking of gains. This is also evidenced by the use of downside risk mea-
sures in normative areas of finance, such as Asset/Liability Management and
risk management, see Section 1.2. An additional problem of combining loss
aversion with cognitive biases, is that it becomes difficult, if not impossible,
to pinpoint the effect of loss aversion on decision making.
The way this thesis stands out in relation to other research in behavioral
finance, is that we (i) focus solely on loss aversion, (ii) consider it a rational
preference, and (iii) focus on the structure of the optimal decisions, rather
than on an axiomatic approach to characterize loss aversion. This way, we
isolate the effect of loss-averse preferences on financial decision making, and
focus on the economics of the resulting decisions.
1.2 Applied finance
Whether founded in theory or not, in the area of applied finance there is
already an asymmetric attitude with respect to gains and losses. The im-
portance of downside risk measures has been recognized and used quite ex-
tensively. See also the work of Artzner et al. (1999), who derive axiomatic
results on the coherence of certain (downside) risk measures. Two applied
areas where the downside risk measures are most visible are those of banking
regulation and Asset/Liability Management.
Banking regulation
Since the early 90s, banks report their risks in a measure called ‘Value-
at-Risk’ (VaR). VaR measures the location of a specified quantile of the
loss distribution. Hence it explicitly associates risk with the downside of
the financial position of a bank, in contrast with traditional measures that
used the overall variability, e.g., the variance, of the return. See the study
of Campbell (2001) who studies the optimal allocation and performance of
portfolios when VaR is the risk measure.
Asset/Liability Management
In applied models for Asset/Liability Management, the risk measure is very
important, as it can influence the outcome of an ALM model considerably.
In Carin˜o et al. (1994) an ALM model is described that was implemented for
the Japanese insurance company Yasuda-Kasai. When considering the risk
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measure to use, they do away with the traditional risk measure, variance of
total return. Arguing that ‘it is unclear that excessive returns are undesir-
able’, they choose to measure the risk for the firm as the expected amount by
which goals are not achieved. Besides the Value-at-Risk measure mentioned
above, a specific risk measure that is considered in research, as well as in ap-
plied ALM models, is expected shortfall. It measures the expected amount
by which a specified target is not met. Alternatively, downside deviation
is used as a shortfall measure that penalizes quadratic shortfall. This way,
larger shortfall gets a proportionally larger penalty.
Most research in ALM has evolved toward solving complex optimization
models with a focus on the solution method, e.g, Consigli and Dempster
(1998). Seeing ALM as a technical challenge makes it an attractive research
subject with the discipline of operations research. Mathematical tools can
be used to come up with optimal investment and funding policies to increase
revenue or decrease costs for financial institutions. However, the problem
with such an approach is that the relation between the risk measure and the
resulting optimal policies remains unclear. At best, a specialized consultant
working with ALM models on a daily basis will develop some intuition for the
sensitivity of the outcomes to alternative parameter values. No fundamental
insights in financial decision making are obtained, however.
The relevance of our work for the area of Asset/Liability Management is
that we (i) consider a parametric solution to models that are basic versions
of advanced ALM models with a downside risk-measure, (ii) analyze the
mechanisms behind the resulting patterns of risk-taking (instead of focusing
on computational aspects), and (iii) obtain results on the robustness for
different specifications of downside risk and other model formulations.
It is worth mentioning here the papers by Basak and Shapiro (2001),
and Berkelaar and Kouwenberg (2000b). They are close in spirit to the
perspective taken in this monograph. Both Basak and Shapiro and Berke-
laar and Kouwenberg focus on optimal policies under loss-averse preferences.
However, to retain tractability, they use continuous-time modeling, combined
with the assumption of complete markets. Our approach, by contrast, con-
siders incomplete markets, and is set in discrete time. To retain tractability,
we focus on simpler loss-averse objective functions.
1.3 Overview of the thesis
The contents of the thesis are best introduced using the diagram in Figure 1.1.
In Chapter 2 the main results for the mean-shortfall model are derived.
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Solution to the Multi−stage
    Mean−Shortfall Model (Ch. 2)
Extensions to the
    Mean−Shortfall Model  (Ch. 3)
Optimal Pension Fund Investment
    under Loss Aversion (Ch. 4)
Household Savings under 
   Loss Aversion (Ch. 5)
Explaining Hedge Fund Returns 
by Loss Aversion (Ch. 6)
Figure 1.1: Overview of the thesis
Optimizing over one risky and one risk-free asset, we find the optimal solu-
tion in terms of initial wealth. We give intuition for the typical risk-taking
behavior that is observed.
We consider the model in Chapter 2 to be a basic representation of models
used in ALM. Also, it is the most basic representation of loss aversion as used
in behavioral finance. However, the exact formulation of loss aversion and
downside risk measures varies in the literature. Chapter 3 considers alterna-
tive specifications of loss aversion to test the robustness of the result from
Chapter 2. Therefore, Chapters 2 and 3 can be considered the basic building
blocks of the thesis. The Chapters 4, 5, and 6 then provide applications of
the results. All these chapters share the basic formulation of the objective
function of Chapter 2.
In Chapter 4 we use loss aversion to analyze the outcomes of an ALM
model for a stylized pension fund. As the financial position of pension funds is
influenced by many sources of uncertainty, this chapter contains a sensitivity
analysis of the results to the specification of uncertainty in the mean-shortfall
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model. Given that pension funds actively perform ALM studies to assist in
decision making, the chapter contains empirical data on actual investment
behavior. We use these data to look for evidence of loss-averse preferences.
Chapter 5 applies the mean-shortfall objective to represent household
preferences for consumption. There is already a large body of literature
on household savings, but very little on the effect of loss aversion. This
chapter shows savings behavior in a two-period model when households have
loss-averse preferences. As commonly analyzed in the literature, we add the
possibility of habit formation to the model, i.e., the second period benchmark
is affected by first-period consumption. The relevance of loss version seems
even more pronounced in the case of habit formation: the existence of a habit
implies, almost by definition, that people do not wish to realize consumption
below a given habitual level.
Chapter 6 analyzes financial decision making for hedge funds when loss-
averse preferences are assumed. Hedge funds are a particular class of mutual
funds, in which only qualified investors can invest. Consequently, they have
a large degree of freedom in the investment strategies they can follow, being
exempt from the regulation that holds for most other mutual funds. The
case of hedge funds is interesting, as they are found to generate non-linear
pay-offs relative to underlying financial indices. This calls for an extension
of the mean-shortfall model with an asset that has a non-linear relation
with the risky asset. We find that the resulting model retains analytical
tractability. We derive a set of optimal pay-off patterns. The results match
empirical patterns found in the literature. We discuss the optimal financial
decisions in terms of specific dynamic investment strategies that hedge funds
can follow. Chapter 7 concludes.
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2Solution to the Multi-stage
Mean-Shortfall model
2.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, we have witnessed a growing literature on financial
planning models. Such models can assist financial institutions like pension
funds, insurance companies and banks in their Asset/Liability Management
(ALM), as illustrated in the book by Ziemba and Mulvey (1998). The key
component in these models concerns the trade-off between risk and return.
It is therefore of paramount importance which risk measure is put into the
model. Traditionally, the variance or standard deviation has been the promi-
nent measure of risk. Its main (and perhaps only) advantage is its computa-
tional simplicity. As argued by Sortino and Van der Meer (1991) however, the
variance is an inadequate measure of risk in many practical circumstances.
The main criticism to the use of the variance is its symmetric nature, whereas
risk is typically perceived as an asymmetric phenomenon. Asymmetric or
downside risk measures are generally more difficult to work with, both ana-
lytically and computationally. Given the current state of computer technol-
ogy and the increased use of derivative assets in investment, however, their
use in both theoretical and empirical financial planning models has increased
rapidly.
Downside-risk measures are currently used extensively in the area of As-
set/Liability Management (ALM). Recent research typically incorporates the
down-side risk measure in a multi-stage stochastic programming (MSP) ap-
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proach, as in Consigli and Dempster (1998), Mulvey and Thorlacius (1998),
Carin˜o et al. (1994), Boender (1997), and Dert (1998). The main advantage
of the MSP approach relative to the more traditional static mean-variance ori-
ented approach is that the explicit dynamic nature of financial decisions can
better be taken into account. For example, a decision now may be followed
by recourse actions in the future. Moreover, different preferences and (dy-
namic) constraints can be modeled directly. As a result, the MSP approach
generally produces significant improvements over static mean-variance based
decisions. These improvements can be exploited when the MSP model is
implemented in practice, as in Carin˜o et al. (1994). The MSP-models used
for ALM, however, also have two interrelated drawbacks.
First, it is often impossible to solve an MSP analytically. As an alterna-
tive, most people seek for computational solutions built around discretiza-
tions of the original MSP, the so-called scenario approach. This gives rise
to a deterministic program as an approximation to the MSP model. See for
example Hiller and Eckstein (1993) who study a financial planning model
from a numerical rather than an analytical or practical perspective. The
computational effort needed to solve the deterministic programming prob-
lem increases rapidly in the number of scenarios used. Second, the numerical
solution typically consists of optimal decisions at every point in time and
in every possible state of nature (as represented in the scenario tree). Even
for simple MSP models and realistically sized scenario structures, this gives
an unwieldy set of numbers that lacks transparency and clear-cut economic
interpretation. Moreover, the numerical solution is only optimal for the spe-
cific scenario tree, parameter values and initial state variables for which the
problem is solved. See also Dupacˇova´ et al. (1998) who check the robustness
of the optimal solution to a stochastic program with respect to out-of-sample
scenarios. The two drawbacks are also acknowledged in Consigli and Demp-
ster (1998), who note on the complexity of the solution to an MSP that “The
solution to these very large and complex problems needs to be followed by
a detailed computer-based analysis of the results in order to supply conve-
niently represented information to the decision maker.” In other words, for
these models to be implemented and used by management or decision mak-
ers, there is a need for a method to summarize optimal decisions in terms of
decision rules, linking optimal decisions in each state of nature to observed
quantities like the assets to liabilities ratio, the state of the economy, etc.
Despite extensive research in the area of Stochastic Programming, ana-
lytic solutions to multistage stochastic programs are rare. The main con-
tribution of this chapter is that we analytically characterize the solution to
a basic multistage financial planning model. It shares the main character-
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istics of more elaborate applied financial planning models that are widely
used in the financial industry, see Ziemba and Mulvey (1998). Besides its
immediate interpretation as a general financial planning model, the model
that is introduced in this chapter will also serve as a basis for the rest of this
thesis. By solving the basic model, we hope to provide insight into the key
mechanisms driving the results of similar full-scale models used in empirical
work. The interaction between the formulation of the MSP model and the
resulting decisions is generally badly understood. By solving our basic model
analytically, we can present the solution as decision rules in feedback-form,
which have an economic interpretation.
It is this interpretation that extends to other chapters. What we learn in
this chapter on decision taking under uncertainty will prove to be very useful
in analyzing behavior that follows from assuming loss averse preferences for
pension funds (Chapter 4), households (Chapter 5), and hedge funds (Chap-
ter 6).
The remainder of this chapter is set up as follows. In Section 2.2 the basic
multi-stage model is introduced. Section 2.3 gives the solution to the model
and the corresponding optimal decision rules. It also gives a number of inter-
esting consequences that follow from the solution. Section 2.4 considers the
case of having multiple risky assets, as is the case in a portfolio optimization.
Section 2.5 ends with a discussion of the found results and concludes. The
Appendix gathers the proofs.
2.2 Model setup
Let Wt denote the wealth of an investor at time t = 0, . . . , T . At each
time t there are two investment opportunities: a risk-free asset with certain
return rf in each period, and a risky asset with uncertain return ut over
period t. Restricting the investment categories to only two assets may appear
restrictive at first sight. However, as shown by for example Merton (1990),
if two-fund separation holds in an economy, all efficient asset allocations are
completely spanned by investments in the risk-free asset and the market
portfolio only. In this case, our ut would represent the return on the market
portfolio, i.e. a portfolio that holds all available securities in proportion to
their market values. See Cass and Stiglitz (1970) for a general discussion of
separation theorems. In Section 2.4 we extend the current model to more
assets, and show that separation holds indeed. The certain return rf can
also be replaced by a time-dependent rf,t, representing for example a term-
structure of interest rates. This does not affect the outcome of the model,
however, so we drop the subscript t for ease of exposition. Note further
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that it is central to this chapter that we leave the exact distribution of ut
unspecified. This way, possible interpretations of u include returns on stock
investments, derivatives, etc.
With the two investment categories given, wealth evolves as
Wt+1 = Wt · rf +Xt · (ut+1 − rf ), t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (2.1)
where Xt is the amount invested in the risky asset at the beginning of pe-
riod t, which is allowed to be state-dependent. We assume that the ut+1s
are independent, though not necessarily identically distributed with absolute
continuous distribution function Gt+1(·) on [0,∞). We assume Et[ut+1] > rf ,
with Et(·) =
∫
· dGt+1, i.e., the expected return on the risky asset always
exceeds the risk-free return. The investor’s objective function is given by
max
X0,...,XT−1
E0[WT ]− λ · E0
[
(WBT −WT )
+
]
, (2.2)
with WBT a benchmark level of wealth at the horizon, λ > 0 a risk-aversion
parameter, and (y)+ denoting the maximum of 0 and y. The investor thus
trades off expected wealth or return against risk. As such, (2.2) contains the
key ingredients of typical financial planning models. Risk in (2.2) is measured
as the expected shortfall of final wealth with respect to the benchmark W BT .
As risk is only associated with the down-side of the distribution of terminal
wealth, the second term in (2.2) is called a downside-risk measure. Note that
an equivalent optimization problem is obtained when we add a term −WB
to (2.2). Hence, the trade-off can be expressed in expected surplus versus
expected shortfall.
If WB = W0, terminal wealth is measured against initial wealth and
risk is interpreted in terms of expected losses. Alternative interpretations of
WB include pension liabilities and index or benchmark returns. The latter
are relevant in a context of relative performance evaluation. Model (2.2)
also serves as a typical example of a financial planning model in Birge and
Louveaux (1997). There the setting is given by parents who wish to provide
for a child’s college education T years from now. In that case W B represents
the tuition goal and λ the cost of borrowing if the goal is not met.
Hiller and Eckstein (1993) use the same objective function as (2.2) in a
stochastic dedication model for fixed-income portfolios. (2.2) also resembles
the objective function of Carin˜o et al. (1994), albeit that they use a piece-
wise linear penalty function in terms of the expected loss, where we have a
linear one. Carin˜o et al. (1994) also argue that in the context of banks and
insurance companies risk measures as in (2.2) can easily be justified: these
companies are faced with specific additional funding costs if reserves fall be-
low critical threshold levels. The risk measure in (2.2) in terms of returns is
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used by Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) in a static stochastic portfolio op-
timization. The model we solve compares to the two-asset case of a model
by Birge and Louveaux (1997). They use it to illustrate the use of scenarios
in transforming the original MSP in a deterministic LP problem. We stick
to the original MSP without resorting to its deterministic implementation.
Note that optimal parametric solutions have been derived for models for-
mulated in continuous-time like in Merton (1969) and Sethi (1998) for the
consumption/investment problem and Ingersoll (1987) for the general port-
folio optimization problem. See also the continuous-time model of Basak
and Shapiro (2001), who optimize expected utility of terminal wealth under
a constraint on downside-risk. By contrast, our model is set in discrete time,
for which few analytic results are available.
The risk aversion parameter λ in (2.2) determines the trade-off between
risk and return. Setting λ = 0 implies risk neutrality, while increasing λ
induces loss aversion. For the moment, we assume λ is determined directly
by the decision maker. In Subsection 2.3.2 we prove that λ can also be set
indirectly by fixing the shortfall probability.
2.3 Results
In this section we obtain three main results. First, using Dynamic Program-
ming and exploiting the special functional form of the objective function, we
obtain the complete solution to model (2.2) up to a set of 2 ∗ T parameters
that depend on the model parameters and the probability distributions of
the risky returns ut+1. These parameters can be computed efficiently for any
given set of distributions Gt+1, t = 0 . . . , T − 1. Second, we prove that there
is a unique shortfall probability associated with any value of λ that gives a
finite solution. This allows the investor to pick λ by specifying preferences
with respect to shortfall probabilities only. Third, we prove that the sensi-
tivity of the decision rules to changes in (relative) wealth increases when the
horizon extends. This provides further evidence for the time-diversification
controversy in finance.
2.3.1 Solution to the multistage model
DefineWBt = W
B
T /r
T−t
f as the risk-free discounted value of benchmark wealth
at time t, and St = Wt−W
B
t as the surplus. The next theorem has the main
result.
13
Theorem 2.3.1 If there is a bounded solution to the optimization problem
in (2.1) and (2.2), then it is given by
X∗t =
rf
rf − u¯∗t+1
· St, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (2.3)
where u¯∗t+1 is smaller than rf for positive surplus and larger than rf for
negative surplus, so X∗t ≥ 0. Specifically, u¯
∗
t+1 is one of two possible u¯s that
solve
Et[ut+1 − rf ] = λt · Et
[
(rf − ut+1) · I{ut+1≤u¯}
]
. (2.4)
The two solutions to (2.4) are labeled u¯+t+1 < rf and u¯
−
t+1 > rf . Further,
λt is defined by
λt =
λ · (p−t+1 − p
+
t+1)
1 + λ · p+t+1
, (2.5)
where for k = t+ 1, . . . , T − 1 the p+k and p
−
k are defined recursively by
p−k = p
−
k+1 ·Gk+1(u¯
−
k+1) + p
+
k+1(1−Gk+1(u¯
−
k+1)), (2.6)
p+k = p
−
k+1 ·Gk+1(u¯
+
k+1) + p
+
k+1(1−Gk+1(u¯
+
k+1)), (2.7)
and p−T ≡ 1, p
+
T ≡ 0.
Proof: See appendix.
The key result of the theorem is that in equation (2.3) we have the exact
shape of the decision rule for X∗t . Moreover, equation (2.4) can be easily
solved numerically for any distribution function Gt+1(·). From the definition
of λt in (2.5) it follows that its value is determined by λ and future values of
u¯∗k, k > t+1. Consequently, the model can be solved by sequentially solving
equation (2.4) for t = T−1, . . . , 0, giving the parameters u¯∗t+1 that determine
the slope of the decision rule for X∗t .
An important property of the optimal solution is that (2.3) and (2.4) rep-
resent the solution to a static model (T = 1), with risk-aversion parameter λ
equal to λt. The multi-stage problem is therefore almost myopic: (i) it can be
solved by solving a sequence of static problems, but (ii) the static problems
are linked through the time-varying risk aversion parameter λt. This can
be exploited to solve the dynamic program numerically without resorting to
scenarios and deterministic equivalents of the original MSP.
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Figure 2.1: Finding the optimal u¯
In this figure, the solid line ‘lhs’ represents the left-hand side of
equation (2.4), which is a constant expression. The dashed line
‘rhs’ represents the right-hand side, which is a function of u¯. The
points of intersection are the u¯s that solve (2.4). The risk-free
rate rf is 1.04, and the uncertain return u is distributed lognor-
mal(0.085, 0.16), representing a typical stock return with a mean
return of 10% and standard deviation of 17%.
With respect to the solution to (2.4), note that the right-hand side of (2.4)
is unimodal in u¯. The maximum is reached at u¯ = rf . Consequently, if
−λt ·Et
[
(ut+1 − rf) · I{ut+1≤rf}
]
< Et[ut+1− rf ], t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (2.8)
(2.4) has two distinct solutions: one smaller and one larger than rf , and (2.8)
is a sufficient condition for having a bounded solution. Under (2.8), solving
equation (2.4) can be visualized as in Figure 2.1. Solving (2.4) and finding
the optimal decision rules (2.3) boils down to evaluating the conditional first
moments of Gt+1(·). This can be done very efficiently. If condition (2.8) is
not met, either u¯∗t+1 = rf or (2.4) has no solution. In both cases, the optimal
decision X∗t in (2.3) is unbounded.
It is shown in the appendix that under (2.8), the two u¯s that solve (2.4)
indeed result in the optimal X∗t . As X
∗
t > 0 at the optimum, it follows
from (2.3) that u¯ < rf and u¯ > rf correspond to the cases of a positive
and a negative time t surplus Wt−W
B
t , respectively. We therefore label the
solutions as u¯+t and u¯
−
t for Wt > W
B
t and Wt < W
B
t , respectively, implying
piecewise linearity of the optimal decision rule in (2.3).
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Figure 2.2: Optimal investment in the risky asset
For a one-period model, this figure shows the optimal investment
in the risky asset, X∗0 , as a function of initial surplus, S0. rf =
1.04, u has a lognormal distribution, with µ = 0.085, and σ =
0.16, representing a typical stock return with a mean of 10% and
standard deviation of 17%.
It is important to note that the piecewise linearity of the optimal decision
rule for Xt in Theorem 2.3.1 holds for any set of absolute-continuous distri-
bution functions Gt+1(·), t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Gt+1(·) only enters the optimal
decision rule through the values of u¯+t+1 and u¯
−
t+1, which follow easily from
equation (2.4). Theorem 2.3.1 thus not only provides the solution to the
dynamic investment problem for standard assets like a stock or bond index.
Even if Gt+1 is the return distribution of a complicated derivative instrument,
piecewise linearity of X∗t still holds
1.
The third consequence of Theorem 2.3.1 follows from the typical shape of
the decision rule for X∗t , which we have plotted in Figure 2.2 for a relevant
set of parameter values and different values for λ. We can observe that
the amount invested in the risky asset is decreasing in the surplus when the
surplus is negative, and increasing in case it is positive. This typical behavior
of the optimal decision rule implies that in an unfavorable situation (negative
surplus) the decision maker takes more risk as the surplus decreases. In the
1A logical extension of distribution functions is one that considers discrete probability
distributions. In this case, absolute continuity is not retained, but the proof of The-
orem 2.3.1 will still hold, with some adjustments. The outcome is predictable, as we
already use discretizations of the probability distributions to plot the optimal solutions
for specific parameter values.
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favorable situation of a positive surplus, the decision maker takes more risk
when the surplus increases. The fact that the slope of the decision rule
is different for the two regimes is due to the different risk taking behavior
implied in the objective function. In a situation of a negative surplus the
decision maker must take more risk: the higher return on the portfolio is
needed to make the probability of recovering from the unfavorable situation
strictly positive. In the situation of a positive surplus risky investments
allow one to profit from the higher expected return, subject to having an
acceptable trade-off with downside-risk. Clearly, if the surplus is positive
and wealth increases, more money can be invested in the risky asset at the
cost of only a marginal increase in downside-risk. This induces a positive
relation between the surplus and the investment in the risky asset. In the
above line of reasoning, the effect of λ is clear, as visualized in Figure 2.2.
Higher values of λ decrease risk taking, for comparable wealth levels.
2.3.2 Tuning the model
The next corollary shows that the multi-stage model can be tuned appropri-
ately by relating the model parameter λ to a specified shortfall probability.
Corollary 2.3.1 If the optimal solution is bounded and initial surplus is
positive, there is a unique λ+ such that under the optimal policies X∗t , t =
0, . . . , T − 1, Pr[WT < W
B] is fixed. For a negative initial surplus, there is a
unique λ− associated with the probability Pr[WT > W
B].
Proof: See appendix.
Corollary 2.3.1 implies that the decision maker does not have to pick λ
in the multi-stage model directly. As the probabilities of a positive and a
negative final surplus are uniquely determined by a choice of λ, the manager
only has to specify her probabilistic preferences with respect to shortfall. A
value for λ then follows immediately. Of course the choices for the probabil-
ities are limited by condition (2.8), which ensures that the optimal decisions
X∗t are finite.
Tuning the model by setting a shortfall or recovery probability rather
than a value for λ, enhances the practical interpretability of the model. The
financial industry widely uses the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR), which is
intimately related to the shortfall probabilities and benchmark wealth levels,
see Jorion (2000). In a static context, Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) propose
a technique for stochastic portfolio optimization in which Mean Shortfall (or
CVaR) is optimized and VaR is calculated simultaneously. As such Corol-
lary 2.3.1 presents the same result for the multi-stage optimization problem.
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Note that λ can not be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier of an optimiza-
tion problem that maximizes terminal wealth with a restriction on expected
shortfall. In our model the probability of shortfall is fixed for a given λ, but
not the expected shortfall itself. If expected shortfall appears in a restriction,
the value of λ as a Lagrange multiplier would change with the surplus.
In a static context, it is obvious that expected shortfall is directly linked
to a quantile of the return distribution. However, in a dynamic context we
have not seen this relationship in the literature before. If applicable in more
elaborate MSP models, it can be a valuable tool in fine-tuning empirical
financial planning models.
Corollary 2.3.2 If λ→∞, the optimal solution to model (2.2) is
X∗t =
{
St if St ≥ 0,
rf
rf−u¯
∗
t+1
St if St < 0,
(2.9)
where u¯∗t+1 is the u¯ that solves
∫ u¯
0
(rf − ut)dGt = 0. (2.10)
Proof: See appendix.
Corollary 2.3.2 shows that for positive surpluses, the optimal investment
in the risky asset equals the surplus. In the case of a positive surplus, it is
clear that increasing the shortfall penalty to infinity drives the allocation to
generate zero expected shortfall. As only the surplus is invested in the risky
asset, loosing the complete investment in the risky asset still leaves exactly
the next-period benchmark wealth WBt+1.
If the surplus is negative, the solution to equation (2.10) induces a positive
investment in the risky asset, which only depends on the distribution of ut
and rf . Compared to the case of a positive surplus, there is no possibility to
rule out shortfall. Hence, the positive excess return on the risky asset leads to
a positive risky investment. Moreover, if the uts are identically distributed,
the allocation in the risky asset is the same at all time periods. Note that
compared to only investing in the risk-free asset, the optimal allocation in
the risky asset decreases the expected shortfall. In Chapter 3 we will derive
results for the limiting portfolio when downside deviation is used as the risk
measure, and also when an extra kink is added to the bilinear objective of
this chapter.
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2.3.3 Time-diversification
The following corollaries give important properties of the λts and the optimal
X∗t , respectively.
Corollary 2.3.3 If the optimization problem (2.2) has a bounded solution,
for T and λ fixed, the values of λt are increasing in t.
Proof: See appendix.
Corollary 2.3.4 If the uts are identically distributed, the absolute slope rf/|u¯
∗
t+1−
rf | of the optimal decision rules in (2.3) is monotonically increasing in the
time to maturity T − t.
Proof: See appendix.
As the λts represent the investor’s risk aversion, Corollary 2.3.3 states that
the investor in the multi-stage setting becomes less risk averse the longer the
time to maturity T − t. As a direct result, Corollary 2.3.4 concludes that
the optimal policies are more sensitive to changes in surplus if the planning
horizon is further away. Moreover, the increasing slopes of the decision rules
imply riskier initial asset allocations for longer planning periods and given
(non-zero) initial surplus.
Corollaries 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 have implications in the area of time diversi-
fication theory. Proponents of time diversification argue that investors hold
riskier asset allocations whenever their investment horizon is further away.
This is generally illustrated in the context of stocks and bonds. The intuition
is that in the long run the increased uncertainty due to a more risky portfolio
is more than compensated by the higher expected return. The uncertainty as
measured by the return standard deviation increases with the square root of
the horizon. By contrast, the expected return increases linearly. As a result,
the shortfall probability of stocks decreases in the distance to the horizon,
and for long horizons stocks almost certainly outperform bonds. Samuelson
(1994), Kritzman and Rich (1998) and Merton and Samuelson (1974), how-
ever, argue that the spread of the distribution of terminal wealth also widens
with the time horizon. Consequently, whereas the probability of a loss de-
creases, the potential magnitude of the loss increases accordingly if riskier
investments are held. This is used as an argument to prove that it could
well be that an investor chooses a less aggressive portfolio if the investment
horizon increases. Corollary 2.3.4 proves, however, that if wealth is measured
against a benchmark level and the magnitude of a loss is taken into account,
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dynamically optimizing risk averse investors hold riskier asset allocations at
longer horizons.
2.4 The multi-asset case
The optimization model in Section 2.2 includes only two assets. We argued
that this is not a serious restriction of the model, as the return on the risky
asset can be interpreted as the return on a market portfolio. In this section
we give the solution to the model when there is more than 1 risky asset. This
changes the focus of the analysis from one that looks only at risk-taking to
one that considers the solution to the model in the broadest sense, namely
as a portfolio selection problem.
We analyze a one-period optimization with two risky assets and one risk-
free asset. For the situation of n risky assets, the interested reader is referred
to the appendix.
Define uA and uB as the return on the risky assets A and B, respectively.
The amounts invested in these assets are represented by XA and XB. The
amount invested in the risk-free asset is therefore W0 −XA −XB. The one-
period optimization problem is now given by
max
XA,XB
E0[W1]− λ · E0
[
(WB −W1)
+
]
, (2.11)
s.t. W1 = W0 · rf +XA · (uA − rf) +XB · (uB − rf ), (2.12)
where WB represents the benchmark at time 1, and λ is again the loss aver-
sion parameter. Defining S0 as the initial surplus W0 − W
B/rf , the main
result is given in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.4.1 If there is a bounded solution, the optimal solution to the
optimization problem in (2.11) is given by
X∗A =
rf
rf − k∗A
S0, (2.13)
X∗B =
rf
rf − k
∗
B
S0, (2.14)
where k∗A, and k
∗
B are equal to k
+
A < rf , k
+
B < rf , and k
−
A > rf , k
−
B > rf for
positive and negative surplus, respectively.
Theorem 2.4.1 shows that for two risky assets, the expressions for the
optimal amounts X∗A and X
∗
B are similar to those for the setting with one
risky asset. There is a piecewise linear relation between the amount invested
20
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
-20 -15 -10 -5  0  5  10  15  20
In
ve
st
ed
 a
m
ou
nt
Surplus S0
Asset A
Asset B
Figure 2.3: Optimal investment with two risky
assets
Asset A is distributed lognormal with µ = 0.085, σ = 0.16, cor-
responding to a mean return of 10% and standard deviation of
17%. The return on asset B is uncorrelated with asset A, log-
normally distributed with µ = 0.10, σ = 0.3, corresponding to a
mean return of 16% and standard deviation of 33%. λ = 5 and
rf = 1.04.
in the risky asset and the surplus. A consequence of this result it that the
ratio of the investments in A and B, i.e., the portfolio composition, is a
constant for either sign of the surplus. Figure 2.3 shows the allocation in two
risky assets that have different risk-return properties.
From Figure 2.3 we can see that for positive and negative surpluses, dif-
ferent portfolio compositions are optimal, i.e., the optimal risk-return profile
differs depending on the starting situation. We could not have observed this
from Figure 2.2, where the investment in one risky asset reaches comparable
levels for negative and positive surpluses. Allowing for nonlinear pay-offs,
Chapter 6 further explores the optimality of pay-off patterns and finds more
specific differences in investment allocation for initial wealth above and below
the benchmark.
Elaborating further on the difference between a positive and negative
initial surplus, there is a serious consequence of the results in terms of an
efficient frontier as used in the CAPM. There, an efficient frontier is con-
structed based on the variance and mean of portfolio returns. Our results,
however, imply that based on expected return and expected shortfall, the
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Figure 2.4: Risk-return frontiers
This figure shows the efficient frontiers for average shortfall versus average surplus for two
initial surplus levels. The left panel has initial surplus of +10%, the right panel of -10%.
Parameter values are rf = 1.04, and uA ∼ logN(0.085, 0.16), uB ∼ logN(0.10, 0.30).
efficient frontier differs for a positive and negative surplus. We illustrate this
for the model with two risky assets in Figure 2.4.
The left panel in Figure 2.4 shows the risk-return frontier in case of a
positive surplus. The efficient frontier starts at zero shortfall and positive
surplus and then shows expected surplus as a function of expected shortfall.
The specific position on the line depends on the value of λ. The right panel
in Figure 2.4 shows the frontier for a negative initial surplus. There, the
frontier does not hit the zero-shortfall axis, i.e., there is no allocation that
gives zero shortfall risk. Efficient allocations are located at the minimum-risk
point and the points to the upper-right of that point. The 100% risk-free
investment would be located to the lower right of the frontier, and is thus
inefficient.
It is remarkable that the effect of having two frontiers instead of one has
gone largely unnoticed in previous research on downside risk measures, for
example in the work of Brouwer (1997), who has thoroughly analyzed effi-
cient frontiers for portfolio optimization under downside risk measures. See
also Huisman et al. (1999), who consider efficient frontiers in a Value-at-Risk
framework. Only in the behavioral portfolio theory of Shefrin and Statman
(2000), which is similar to a Value-at-Risk framework, also two efficient fron-
tiers are found, based on the different ‘aspiration levels’ of investors.
A possible explanation of overlooking the existence of two efficient fron-
tiers can be that most researchers assume an investor with a ‘positive surplus’,
i.e., the starting situation is favorable. However, when an explicit down-side
risk measure is used, it seems reasonable to consider the possibility of an
investor actually reaching or being in a situation of negative surplus. In
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that case, our results suggest that the investor should change his portfolio
composition.
A final consequence of the Theorem 2.4.1 is that it sheds light on the
interpretation of the risky return we gave in the model of Section 2.2. There
we interpreted ut as the return on the market portfolio, while we just derived
that in a portfolio context there is not one, but there are two optimal asset
mixes.2 Although we do not prove it formally, it can be shown that the results
in Section 2.2 continue to hold, except for the fact that the u¯ts need a more
subtle interpretation. Such a solution would simultaneously characterize the
solution to a T -period model with n risky assets.
2.5 Conclusions and discussion
In this chapter we analytically characterized the solution to a multi-stage
financial planning model involving a trade-off between return and downside-
risk. Our model shares the same basic characteristics of more elaborate
empirical models like that of Carin˜o et al. (1994). Downside-risk was used
because of its widespread popularity in the financial industry and its use in re-
lated academic work. Risk was measured with respect to a benchmark wealth
level, which can be interpreted as a liability level in case of Asset/Liability
Management (ALM) problems. We have derived the analytic characteriza-
tion of the optimal solutions in feedback form, i.e., as decision rules. This
form has a clear-cut economic interpretation, which constitutes a valuable
addition to the existing literature where solutions are often derived numeri-
cally rather than analytically.
One of the salient findings of this chapter is the V-shape in terms of the
investment in the risky asset as a function of the surplus. This result does
not hinge on the probability distribution of the return on the risky asset.
The distribution only determines the relative steepness of the decision rule
for positive and negative values of the surplus.
In contrast to many traditional continuous-time analyses involving util-
ity functions, our model results in additional risk taking behavior both in
situations of under-funding and over-funding. In case of under-funding (i.e.,
a negative surplus), taking risk is the only way to make the probability of
a positive final surplus positive. In case of over-funding (i.e., a positive sur-
plus), making risky investments increases expected return without unduly
affecting downside-risk measures.
2Notice that our results suggest three-fund separation for the static mean-shortfall
model, opposed to two-fund separation in a mean-variance world.
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For all practical purposes, it is important for the implementation of any
mathematical model that model parameters can be chosen in an intuitive
manner. For the basic financial planning model we presented in this chapter,
we find that the choice for the parameter that reflects downside-risk aversion
is directly connected to the probability of shortfall at the horizon. This shows
that in this case a decision maker can make the trade-off between return and
downside-risk explicit by choosing an appropriate shortfall probability. Using
a more popular concept in the area of finance, this is equivalent to specifying
a Value-at-Risk quantile for the wealth distribution at the horizon. Note
however that the resulting optimal investment strategy still accounts for both
the event and the extent of shortfall. As such, it does not suffer from the
drawbacks of a purely VaR-based objective function, which only incorporates
the event or probability of shortfall.
We have proved that the solution can be represented as the solution to
a sequence of one-period models where the typical shape of the decision
rules is constant over time. Its steepness, however, decreases because the
appropriate risk aversion parameter increases over time. This leads directly
to the paradigm of time diversification: investors hold riskier asset allocations
if the planning period is longer. The increased riskiness of the portfolio is
offset by the larger set of possible future recourse actions.
On the computational side, our analytic results also give rise to some
interesting directions for future research. As the piece-wise linear structure
of the optimal decision rules does not depend on the initial level of surplus nor
on the precise form of the return distribution, optimal solutions to dynamic
versions of our model can be found by an easy decomposition of the dynamic
model into repeated one-period models. Specifically, more complex financial
planning models could be solved through a decision-rule based approach,
optimizing over the basis and slopes of a V shape. Such a decomposition
allows for a considerable reduction in computational burden without affecting
the optimality of the solution found. A useful line of future research would
be to investigate to what extent similar properties hold and can be exploited
in more elaborate empirical MSP models of this type.
Finally, we have motivated the choice for expected shortfall as the risk
measure based on the observation that it is widely used in Asset/Liability
Management studies. We have also explained that it is similar to the value
function found empirically by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Besides the
fact that we can derive closed-form decision rules, the fact that the solution is
not (yet) observed in practice makes it even more interesting. If the objective
function is used in ALM, then the effect found is relevant for institutions and
regulators alike, and is something to be reckoned with. However, there are
many more possibilities of objective functions that can be called loss averse,
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and so it remains to be seen how restrictive the bilinear formulation of the
objective is, and whether the result carry over to other loss averse objectives.
We explore the consequences of using other objective functions in Chapter 3.
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Appendix
2.A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1:
We solve the optimization problem as given by equations (2.1) and (2.2) by
dynamic programming. Start with the following sequence of value functions:
Vt(Wt) = max
Xt
Et[Vt+1(Wt+1rf +Xt(ut+1 − rf))], (2A.1)
t = 0, . . . , T,
VT (WT ) = WT − λ · [W
B
T −WT ]
+ (2A.2)
where Et is defined as the conditional expectation given ut−1, ut−2, . . . , u1.
Given Wt, Vt(Wt) is the expected value of the objective function when all
decisions from time t on are taken optimally. Clearly, solving the model is
equivalent to finding V0(W0).
The first order condition with respect to XT−1 is obtained by differenti-
ating VT (WT ) to XT−1 and is given by
ET−1[uT − rf ] + λ ·
∫ u¯T
0
(uT − rf)dGT (uT ) = 0, (2A.3)
where u¯T is defined as
u¯T = rf +
WBT −WT · rf
XT−1
. (2A.4)
As shown in the main text, if condition (2.8) holds, (2A.3) solves for
two distinct values of u¯T . To proof that the resulting X
∗
T−1 is optimal, we
consider the second-order condition for the problem at T − 1:
∂2VT (WT )
∂X2T−1
= −λ ·
(WBT −WT−1rf)
2
X3T−1
· gT (u¯(XT−1)) < 0, (2A.5)
where gt(·) is defined as the density function of ut, for t = 1, . . . , T .
As λ > 0, it follows from (2A.5) that an optimal X∗T−1 should be positive
at the optimum. Therefore, only a u¯T < rf can be optimal ifW
B
T −WT−1rf <
0. Otherwise, X∗T−1 would be negative. Also, only a u¯T > rf can be optimal
if WBT − WT−1rf > 0. As these two cases correspond to a positive and a
negative surplus, respectively, we define u¯+T and u¯
−
T as the corresponding
values of u¯.
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As Xt−1 influences the objective function only through the effect on Wt,
i.e. there are no direct costs associated with a choice of Xt−1, the first order
condition with respect to Xt−1, t < T is
Et−1
[
∂Vt(Wt)
∂Xt−1
]
= Et−1
[
∂Vt(Wt)
∂Wt
·
∂Wt
∂Xt−1
]
= 0. (2A.6)
Let W ∗t+1 = rfWt +X
∗
t · (ut+1 − rf), with X
∗
t the optimal decision at time t.
We have
∂Vt(Wt)
∂Wt
= Et
[
∂Vt+1(Wt+1)
∂Wt+1
·
∂W ∗t+1
∂Wt
]
= rf · Et
[
∂Vt+1(Wt+1)
∂Wt+1
]
= r2f · Et
[
∂Vt+2(Wt+2)
∂Wt+2
]
= . . . = rT−tf Et
[
1 + λ · I{ST<0}
]
,
(2A.7)
where IA is the indicator function of the event A. In this case it is equal to
1 if ST < 0 and 0 otherwise.
Using (2A.7) and the fact that ∂Wt/∂Xt−1 = ut − rf , the first order
condition in (2A.6) becomes
Et−1
[
∂Vt(Wt)
∂Xt−1
]
= Et−1[r
T−t
f ·(ut−rf )]+λ·Et−1[r
T−t
f ·(ut−rf )·I{ST<0}] = 0.
(2A.8)
Dividing by rT−tf and partitioning based on the sign of St gives
Et−1[ut−rf ]+λ·Et−1[(ut−rf )·I{ST<0}∩{St<0}]+λ·Et−1[(ut−rf )·I{ST<0}∩{St>0}] = 0.
(2A.9)
Note that for given Wt−1, X
∗
t−1 is fixed. As the uts are independent, St
only varies monotonically with the realization of ut. By absolute continuity
of Gt(·), we do not have to consider the case St = 0, so we can define a u¯t
such that St > 0 for ut > u¯t and St < 0 for ut < u¯t. This reduces (2A.9) to
Et−1[ut − rf ] + λ ·
∫ u¯t
0
(ut − rf) Pr(ST < 0|St)dGt(ut)
+ λ ·
∫ ∞
u¯t
(ut − rf ) Pr(ST < 0|St)dGt(ut) = 0.
(2A.10)
Assume
Pr(ST < 0|St) =
{
p+t if St > 0,
p−t if St < 0.
(2A.11)
27
The above assumption states that the probability of ending up with a
negative terminal surplus only depends on the sign of the time t surplus St
and not on its value. This clearly holds for t = T with p+T = 0 and p
−
T = 1.
(2A.11) implies that equation (2A.10) can be rewritten as
Et−1[ut−rf ]+λ ·p
−
t ·
∫ u¯t
0
(ut−rf)dGt(ut)+λ ·p
+
t ·
∫ ∞
u¯t
(ut−rf)dGt(ut) = 0,
(2A.12)
which simplifies to
(1+ λ · p+t ) ·Et−1[ut− rf ] + λ · (p
−
t − p
+
t ) ·
∫ u¯t
0
(ut− rf)dGt = 0, (2A.13)
or, dividing by (1 + λ · p+t )
Et−1[ut − rf ] +
λ · (p−t − p
+
t )
(1 + λ · p+t )
·
∫ u¯t
0
(ut − rf )dGt = 0. (2A.14)
Defining λt−1 as
λt−1 =
λ · (p−t − p
+
t )
1 + λ · p+t
, (2A.15)
we can write (2A.14) as
Et−1[ut − rf ] + λt−1 ·
∫ u¯t
0
(ut − rf )dGt = 0. (2A.16)
As equation (2A.16) is the time-t version of the first order condition for
the problem at T−1, we can use the exact same reasoning as for the equation
in (2A.3). So, if condition (2.8) holds this equation solves for two distinct u¯t,
corresponding to a positive and a negative surplus, respectively. Moreover,
the corresponding optimal X∗t−1 is such that the next period’s surplus, St, is
positive for a realization of the risky return ut > u¯t and negative for ut < u¯t.
Therefore,
Pr(ST < 0|St−1) = Pr(ST < 0|St < 0) · Pr(St < 0|St−1) (2A.17)
+ Pr(ST < 0|St > 0) · Pr(St > 0|St−1)
= p−t ·
∫ u¯t
0
dGt(ut) + p
+
t ·
∫ ∞
u¯t
dGt(ut), (2A.18)
where u¯t = u¯
+
t for St−1 > 0 and u¯t = u¯
−
t for St−1 < 0. As both u¯
+
t and u¯
−
t are
constant, (2A.18) clearly shows that Pr(ST < 0|St−1) also satisfies (2A.11).
The proof now follows by induction.
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Proof of Corollary 2.3.1:
Define G−t and G
+
t by Gt(u¯
−
t ) and Gt(u¯
+
t ), respectively. Given a value of λ,
u¯+T and u¯
−
T are uniquely determined for the decision problem at time T − 1
. In turn, u¯+T and u¯
−
T determine G
+
T and G
−
T which determine p
+
T−1 and
p−T−1. Repeating this procedure for all previous subproblems finally gives a
unique p+0 or p
−
0 , depending on whether S0 > 0 or S0 < 0, respectively. This
implies that if a certain p+0 or p
−
0 is chosen, there will be either an unbounded
solution, or a bounded solution with a unique λ associated with it.
Proof of Corollary 2.3.2:
Consider the proof of Theorem 2.3.1. If λ→∞, the first order condition at
T − 1 simplifies to∫ u¯
0
(rf − uT )dGT = 0. (2A.19)
This equation has two solutions. For positive surplus, u¯+ = 0, implying
X∗T−1 = ST−1. In the proof of Theorem 2.3.1, this puts p
+
T to zero. For
negative surplus, there is a u¯− > rf that solves (2A.19), see Figure 2.1. p
−
T−1
is positive. Following the proof of Theorem 2.3.1, we arrive at a first order
condition for Xt given by
Et−1[ut − rf ] + λ · p
−
t ·
∫ u¯t
0
(ut − rf)dGt = 0, (2A.20)
where p−t is recursively defined as p
−
t+1 · Gt(u¯
−
t ), with p
−
T = 1. The result
follows by dividing by λp−t and letting λ→∞.
Proof of Corollary 2.3.3:
The risk aversion parameter at time t, λt is defined in (2A.15). From (2A.18)
we have that p+t and p
−
t are defined recursively as
p−t = p
−
t+1 ·Gt(u¯
−
t ) + p
+
t+1(1−Gt(u¯
−
t )), (2A.21)
p+t = p
−
t+1 ·Gt(u¯
+
t ) + p
+
t+1(1−Gt(u¯
+
t )), (2A.22)
and p−T = 1, p
+
T = 0.
As u¯−t > u¯
+
t , we have 1 > G
−
t > G
+
t > 0 for any t. Using (2A.21)
and (2A.22), we can write
p−t − p
+
t = (p
−
t+1 − p
+
t+1) · (G
−
t+1 −G
+
t+1), i = 0, . . . , n− 1. (2A.23)
As p−T > p
+
T and (G
−
t+1 −G
+
t+1) < 1 for all t, this implies that
p−t − p
+
t < p
−
t+1 − p
+
t+1, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (2A.24)
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i.e., {p−t − p
+
t }
T
0 is a strictly positive and increasing sequence in t. Moreover,
as p−t > p
+
t , it follows from (2A.22) that p
+
t+1 < p
+
t . Using this and (2A.24), it
is easy to see that the numerator in the definition of λt (2A.15) is increasing
in t, while the denominator is decreasing in t. Hence λt is increasing in t,
and thus decreasing in the time to maturity T − t.
Proof of Corollary 2.3.4:
With identically distributed returns ut, t = 1, . . . , T , the solution to (2.4)
depends only on the value of λt. As can be observed from Figure 2.1, a larger
value of λt corresponds to a larger distance between the u¯t+1s and rf . This
implies that the distance |rf − u¯
∗
t+1| is increasing in t. Hence, the absolute
slope rf/|rf − u¯
∗
t | in the decision rule for X
∗
t is decreasing in t.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.1
The optimization problem is given by
max
XA,XB
E0[W1]− λ · E0
[
(WB −W1)
+
]
, (2A.25)
s.t. W1 = W0 · rf +XA · (uA − rf) +XB · (uB − rf ), (2A.26)
which can be written as
maxE[W1]− λ ·
∫
SF
(WB −W1)dG(uA, uB), (2A.27)
with SF defined as the set
SF =
{
(uA, uB) ∈ R
2|S0rf +XA(uA − rf ) +XB(uB − rf ) < 0
}
, (2A.28)
where S0 = W0 −W
B/rf . For given S0, XA and XB the set SF defines the
area in (uA, uB)-space where there is shortfall, i.e., W1 < W
B. Given the
expression in (2A.27), the first order conditions for XA and XB are given by
XA : E[uA − rf ] + λ ·
∫
SF
(uA − rf)dG(uA, uB) = 0, (2A.29)
XB : E[uB − rf ] + λ ·
∫
SF
(uB − rf)dG(uA, uB) = 0. (2A.30)
These expressions are easily derived, as by definition shortfall is zero along
the border of the area of integration SF . To visualize the area SF , define
u¯A =
WB −W0rf +XArf +XBrf
XA
, (2A.31)
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Figure 2.5: The area of integration, SF , as a function of u¯A and u¯B.
and
u¯B =
WB −W0rf +XBrf +XArf
XB
. (2A.32)
The area of integration, SF , can now be represented as a triangular area
where the points of the triangle are at (0, 0), (u¯A, 0), and (0, u¯B), as shown
in Figure 2.5.
From the the definitions of u¯A and u¯B in (2A.31), and (2A.32), respec-
tively, we can infer that the pairs (u¯∗A, u¯
∗
B) that solve the first-order con-
ditions (2A.29) and (2A.30), directly determine the optimal X∗A and X
∗
B.
Hence, solving (2A.25) boils down to finding the optimal u¯∗A and u¯
∗
B.
From the definition of u¯A and u¯B, write
u¯B −
u¯B
u¯A
rf = −
S0rf
XB
+ rf . (2A.33)
Assuming that XA and XB are both nonnegative at the optimum
3, we find
that
u¯B −
u¯B
u¯A
rf =
{
< rf if S0 > 0,
> rf if S0 < 0.
(2A.34)
3We could have derived this from the second-order condition, but leave it to an as-
sumption here. It is also quite obvious, given that the expected return on assets A and B
is strictly larger than rf
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Now observe that the expression u¯B − u¯B/u¯Arf is exactly the point in
Figure 2.5 on the y-axis where the line from (0, u¯A) to (0, u¯B) intersects
with the vertical line at uA = rf . That means that the above definition can
be visualized as asserting that for a positive surplus, the point (rf , rf) lies
outside the grey triangle in Figure 2.5, while for a negative surplus (rf , rf)
lies on the inside. This separates the possible solutions u¯∗A and u¯
∗
B to the
first order condition, based on the sign of the surplus.
Assume that there are pairs (u¯+A, u¯
+
B), and (u¯
−
A, u¯
−
B) that solve the system
given by equations (2A.29) and (2A.30) for positive and negative surplus,
respectively. In that case, we can gather terms involving XA and XB in the
objective function (2A.27), which are multiplied by 0. What is left is the
value of the objective function given by
V ∗(W0) = W0rf + λ · (W0rf −W
B) ·
∫
SF
dG(uA, uB). (2A.35)
For positive surplus, the expression for V ∗ in (2A.35) is maximal for the
(u¯+A, u¯
+
B) that give the highest probability mass over the area of integration.
In the case of a negative surplus, V ∗ is maximal for the area with small-
est probability mass. A direct consequence is that the optimal solution is
characterized by two pairs (u¯+A, u¯
+
B) and (u¯
−
A, u¯
−
B) for a positive and negative
surplus, respectively, that give maximal objective value. Pairs (u¯A, u¯B) that
solve the first order conditions do not have to be unique. For each sign of
the surplus only the pair that gives the highest objective value determines
the optimal solution.
The expressions forX∗A andX
∗
B follow from the definitions of u¯A in (2A.31)
and u¯B in (2A.32). The k
∗
A and k
∗
B in Theorem 2.4.1 are given by
k∗A = u¯
∗
A −
u¯∗A
u¯∗B
rf , (2A.36)
k∗B = u¯
∗
B −
u¯∗B
u¯∗A
rf , (2A.37)
which completes the proof.
n risky assets
For more than two risky assets, the proof follows along the same lines as that
of Theorem 2.4.1. First order condition for risky asset i is given by
E[ui − rf ] + λ ·
∫
SF
(ui − rf)dGi = 0, i = 1, . . . , n, (2A.38)
where SF is the set {(u1, . . . , un) ∈ R
n|S0rf +
∑n
i (Xi(ui − rf )) < 0}.
Define
u¯i =
X1rf + . . .+Xnrf − S0rf
Xi
, i = 1, . . . , n. (2A.39)
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Now, the area of integration SF is Rn+, bounded by the hyperplane through
the points (u¯1e1, . . . , u¯nen), where ei is a vector of length n with zeros every-
where, and a 1 at position i.
We can deduce that
u¯i −
∑
j 6=iX
∗
j rf
X∗i
= −
S0
X∗i
rf + rf
{
≤ rf if S0 ≥ 0,
> rf if S0 < 0,
(2A.40)
assuming the X∗j s are all positive, compare equation (2A.34). From the
definition of the u¯js we have that at the optimum
X∗j = X
∗
i · u¯
∗
i/u¯
∗
j , (2A.41)
which we can use to rewrite (2A.40) as
u¯∗i ·
(
1−
∑
j 6=i
rf
u¯∗j
){
≤ rf if S0 ≥ 0,
> rf if S0 < 0.
(2A.42)
When expression on the left-hand side of (2A.42) is equal to rf , the hy-
perplane that limits the set SF goes through the point with coordinate
(rf , rf , . . . , rf). Hence, the set of solutions can be split in solutions that
are valid for positive and those that are valid for negative surplus. The u¯∗i s
that give the highest objective value for each sign of the surplus solve the
optimization problem with n risky assets.
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3Extensions to the Mean-Shortfall
Model
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has presented the optimal solution to the mean-shortfall
model. The optimal decision(rule) took the form of a V-shape, with risky
investments increasing in the extent of being above or below a pre-specified
benchmark wealth level. However, in practice and theory, other specifications
of loss averse preferences are used. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to
see whether the V-shape found in Chapter 2 is only the result of our specific
choice of the bilinear objective, or whether it results from a larger class of
loss averse objectives.
To test the robustness of the results, we generalize the model in 4 direc-
tions relevant empirically. First, we explore the consequences of taking the
value function estimated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as the objective.
This objective function is closely related to the mean-shortfall objective of
Chapter 2, and is referred to in the literature as ‘the behavioral value func-
tion’. The most important difference with the bilinear objective is that the
marginal penalty on a shortfall is decreasing in the extent of the loss. Sec-
tion 3.2 explores the properties of this objective function, and its results
when used in an optimization. We discuss the appropriateness of its use in
finance and use our results to shed new light on some well-known papers in
behavioral finance.
Second, Section 3.3 establishes results on the optimal investment strat-
35
egy as a function of wealth if the marginal penalty on losses increases in
the magnitude of a loss. Such risk-measures, e.g. downside deviation, are
predominantly used in ALM studies. For financial institutions, the effect of
increased risk-taking when wealth decreases, is seen by many as undesirable.
In the same section we also want to increase understanding of the outcomes
that describe behavior in unfavorable circumstances.
Third, in Section 3.4 we add an extra ‘kink’ to the bilinear objective
function. The additional kink reflects an increased aversion to shortfall with
respect to a risk-free investment on top of the aversion to shortfall with
respect to the pre-specified benchmark.
Fourth, in Section 3.5 we address the issue of restrictions on the asset
allocation. The original model can lead to allocations in one asset category
of far more than 100%. This is not practically feasible for most economic
agents. It can also create a positive probability of negative wealth. The
consequences of limiting the allowable investment fractions are explored in
Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
Note that this chapter focuses on generalizations of Chapter 2 in terms
of the objective function and allowable investment strategies. An alternative
direction of generalization of Chapter 2 concerns the specification of uncer-
tainty in the model. This is left to Chapter 4, where extra uncertainty is
introduced in a framework that addresses the economic relevance of the loss
averse model for pension funding.
3.2 The behavioral value function
The previous chapter already presented much of the evidence that is found
in the literature on loss aversion. Specifically, we saw that modeling utility
in terms of gains and losses already dates back to Markowitz (1952). Re-
cent literature mostly refers to the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
First, they introduced a transformation function that transforms objective
probabilities into subjective probabilities, bringing about a deviation from
expected utility. Second, they estimated specific shapes for the utility func-
tion below and above a reference point. In experiments they found that
subjects were risk loving in losses, and risk averse in gains. That is, with
respect to gains people rather prefer a sure gain to an uncertain gamble with
the same expected pay-off. For losses, people prefer the gamble with uncer-
tain pay-off to the sure loss. The typical function that has these properties
is generally referred to as the ‘behavioral value function’, a term we will use
as well. Considering the transformation of probabilities is beyond the scope
of this chapter. We assume in the following that the optimizer knows and
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uses the objective probabilities.
The possible existence of a behavioral function has serious implications
for situations in which people make decisions under risk. When a substan-
tial loss is suffered, people can have the tendency to increase risk-taking,
even when the expected return is negative. The latter is documented in for
example Thaler and Johnson (1990), who find that when decision makers
have prior losses, outcomes which offer the opportunity to “break even” are
especially attractive. Going further, Shefrin and Statman (1985) pose that
professional investors are also risk-loving with respect to losses. Investors
have a “disposition to ride losers too long”, i.e., holding on to stocks with
decreasing market value too long. The explanation in their paper is based on
the ‘S’ shape of the value function to be introduced further below in (3.1).
If this explanation is correct, and the S shape is indeed a distinguishing fea-
ture compared to the bilinear approximation we considered in the previous
chapter, there is all the more reason to investigate what optimal investment
policies with these preferences look like in the framework of Chapter 2. At the
end of this section we examine whether the S shaped value function results
in an aversion to the realization of a losses claimed by Shefrin and Statman.
We start our analysis of the consequences of using the behavioral value
function by considering the value function as estimated by Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992). With x the deviation from the reference point, a value func-
tion v(·) assigns a subjective valuation to any outcome x according to
v(x) =
{
xα if x ≥ 0,
−γ · (−x)β if x < 0,
(3.1)
where α = β = 0.88, and γ = 2.25. The bilinear formulation of the objective
function in Chapter 2 can be considered a special case of this formulation by
setting α = β = 1. In Figure 3.1 a plot of the value function (3.1) against a
fit of the piecewise-linear approximation, (2.2) of Chapter 2, is shown.
A first observation from Figure 3.1 is that the fit of the approximation on
the value function (3.1) is very good. Any bilinear function can be written in
the form of a mean-shortfall model around the reference point. The observed
fit does not depend on the choice of scale, a consequence of the basic power
functions of which the value function is constructed.
A second observation concerns the shape of the value function. From the
formula in (3.1), and given that α and β are both smaller than 1, it follows
that the function has an S-shape. In Figure 3.1 this is not clear to see for
gains, but it is visible for negative deviations from the reference point. The
convexity in the domain of losses implies risk-loving behavior in losses, while
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Figure 3.1: The Kahneman-Tversky value func-
tion
The solid line plots the Kahneman-Tversky value function as given
in (3.1). The dashed line plots a bilinear approximation that has
a slope of 0.85 to the right of the reference point, and of -1.85 on
the left-hand side.
the concavity on the side of gains represents risk-averse behavior in gains.
To see the impact in terms of optimal investment decisions, we analyze a
one-period investment model with the same setup as in Chapter 2, but with
a different objective function. Using the definition of the value function v(·)
in (3.1), the optimization problem is given by
max
X0
E[v(W0rf +X0(u− rf)−W
B)], (3.2)
where, as in Chapter 2, W0 is the initial wealth, rf the risk-free (gross) rate of
return, X0 the amount of stock investment, u the uncertain return on stocks
and WB the benchmark level of wealth. This problem is again the most basic
representation of optimal investment under uncertainty.
The solution to problem (3.2) is analyzed for a stock return distribution
G(·) with lognormal distribution that has an expected return of 10% and
standard deviation of 17%, representing plausible parameter values for his-
torical stock returns. The risk-free rate is 1.04, the benchmark W B is 104.
This way, an initial wealth level of 100 is needed to reach the benchmark
WB with certainty by investing only in the risk-free asset. We solve (3.2) by
discretizing the return u and optimizing numerically.
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The first result of solving (3.2) is that for nonpositive surpluses the op-
timal solution is unbounded, i.e., the optimal stock investment is infinite.
So either the distributional assumptions for G(·) and rf are not realistic,
or the setup of the investment problem in (3.2) is not comparable with the
setting in which the value function is estimated. The first possibility can be
ruled out, as the assumption on the risk-free rate and stock-return are not
extraordinary, see Siegel (1992) for an overview of averages and standard de-
viations for stock returns, measured over different time periods. Rather, the
Kahneman-Tversky value function with parameter values estimated in Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1992) is probably not an adequate reflection of aggregate
preferences of stock market participants. Note that for positive surpluses the
optimal solution is bounded, which will be presented shortly.
Having established that the value function as estimated by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) is not appropriate for the basic investment model, it is
too early to discard the general S-shaped value function completely, as it is
possible that the estimated parameter values are just not suitable for the
investment context. To explore the investment behavior induced by an S-
shaped value function in non-degenerate cases, the results of Shumway (1997)
are useful. There, γ and α in (3.1) are estimated using stock return data.
Shumway finds estimates γˆ = 3.11, and αˆ = 0.758. These parameter values
give bounded solutions for a relevant range of surpluses, but lead to unre-
alistically high risky investments for slight underfunding. Our optimization
framework illustrates that parameter values estimated from aggregate data
may lead to unrealistic behavior at the level of individual optimizing agents.
As the stock investments for negative surpluses are extremely high, we add
a third set of parameter values, namely γ = 4, and α = 0.88. The opti-
mal stock investment as a function of the surplus for all three parameter
combinations is displayed in Figure 3.2.
Looking at the results in Figure 3.2, we see that the parameter values
as estimated by Shumway (1997) lead to extremely high stock investment
for negative surpluses. This is a worrying result, as the parameter values
were not estimated in a laboratory experiment, but were estimated using
actual stock return data. The outcomes suggest that realistic risk preferences
cannot be inferred from stock price behavior as done by Shumway, or that
the specification of the behavioral value function is flawed.
The decision rule for the parameter set with γ = 4 clearly shows a V-
shape. We already found that the bilinear objective function is a good ap-
proximation to the behavioral value function. Figure 3.2 shows that result
to carry over to the evaluation of the shape of the decision rule.
An additional check to see if the left- and right-hand sides of the V in the
figure are truly straight lines is to consider the probability of underfunding,
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Figure 3.2: Optimal solution for a behavioral value function
This figure shows the optimal level of stock investment X∗0 using Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s value function with different parameter values for γ and α. The parameter values
γ = 2.25, α = 0.88 (solid line), are estimated in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). We these
parameters only the solution for positive surplus is shown, giving unbounded solutions
for surplus ≤ 0. Parameter values γ = 3.11, α = 0.758 are from Shumway (1997). The
horizontal axis gives the value of the surplus S0 = W0 −W
B/rf . The solution is com-
puted numerically with 100 discretizations for the stock return distribution, lognormally
distributed with parameters µ = 0.085, σ = 0.16.
or, equivalently, the return u¯ that gives final wealth of exactly W B. By
definition
u¯ =
WB −W0rf
X0
+ rf
= rf − rf · S0/X0,
(3.3)
see definition (2A.4) in Chapter 2. From this definition it is immediately
clear that whenever X∗0 is linear in the surplus W0 −W
B/rf , the associated
u¯ is a constant. To check the linearity of the V-shape, Figure 3.3 shows the
values of u¯∗ as a function of W0.
We see that the values of u¯∗ are almost constant on either side of the
discounted benchmark, with a very small area around zero surplus where the
u¯∗s approach 1. For absolute levels of the surplus larger than 2, the lines are
horizontal straight lines.
Note that the observed similarity of the shape of the decision rules with
those of the previous chapter does not mean that the optimal fraction in
stocks is the same as for the bilinear objective. The actual solution depends
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This figure shows u¯∗ = rf − rf · S0/X
∗
0 , against different values
of initial surplus, S0. There is a discontinuity at zero, where u¯ is
undefined.
on the specific parameter values chosen.
Ride losers too long, sell winners too early
Given the results derived so far, we now consider whether the S shape of the
behavioral value function results in the behavior suggested by Shefrin and
Statman (1985). As we want to discuss their claim in detail, consider the
following citation quote in which they motivate their claim:
“To see how the disposition to sell winners and ride losers emerges
in prospect theory, consider an investor who purchased a stock one
month ago for
 
50 and who finds that the stock is now selling at
 
40. The investor must now decide whether to realize the loss or
hold the stock for one more period. To simplify the discussion,
assume that there are no taxes or transaction costs. In addition,
suppose that one of two equiprobable outcomes will emerge during
the coming period: either the stock will increase in price by
 
10
or decrease in price by
 
10. According to prospect theory, our
investor frames his choice as a choice between the following two
lotteries:
A. Sell the stock now, thereby realizing what had been a
 
10
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“paper loss.”
B. Hold the stock for one more period, given 50-50 odds between
losing an additional
 
10 or “breaking even.”
Since the choice between these lotteries is associated with the con-
vex portion of the S-shaped value function, prospect theory implies
that B will be selected over A. That is, the investor will ride his
losing stock. An analogous argument demonstrates why prospect
theory gives rise to a disposition to realize gains.”
The importance of the quoted citation is that the reasoning is very straight-
forward, and appeals to intuition. Having a utility function that is convex in
some area induces excessive risk-taking. Too much concavity in gains induces
profit-taking behavior. Two problems arise, however, after having read the
above claim. First, it is unclear to what benchmark case the terms ‘too long’
and ‘too short’ refer. It implies that the authors have an idea of normative
optimality, which is not met by the investment strategy following from the
behavioral value function. Second, it is not known under what conditions the
claimed effect will or will not arise. We leave the first point for what it is,
interpreting the disposition as ‘riding losers long, selling winners early’. This
way the problem of having to devise a proper benchmark case is neutralized.
We concentrate on modeling buy and sell behavior in an investment model
with a behavioral value function. As a side note, observe that Shefrin and
Statman’s use of the term prospect theory only considers the use of the value
function, and not the transformation of probabilities, so their claim should
hold under expected utility maximization.
To analyze Shefrin and Statman’s claim, we solve an optimization model
that matches the cited investment problem. Define again v(·) as the Kahneman-
Tversky value function defined in (3.1). The optimization problem is given
by
max
δ
v(S), (3.4)
s.t. S = δ · P1 · u+ (1− δ) · P1rf − P0, (3.5)
δ ∈ {0, 1}, (3.6)
where P0 represents the initial stock price of   50, P1 is the current price of
the stock, which is   40 in the citation quote above. The decision variable δ
represents the decision to either hold or sell the stock. If δ = 1, the investor
holds the stock and receives P1 · u in the next period. If δ = 0, the proceeds
of selling the stock are put in the risk-free asset, realizing proceeds of P1 · rf .
Consequently, the variable S represents the surplus relative to the benchmark
at the end of the next period.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of holding and selling the stock
For holding (δ = 1) and selling(δ = 0) the stock, these figures give the prospective value
as a function of the current stock price P . P = 40 is the point of interest in the example
of Shefrin and Statman (1985). The top left panel gives the result for the parameters that
match Shefrin and Statman’s setup, i.e., the behavioral value function given in (3.1) with
γ = 2.25 and α = 0.88, u is either 1.25 or 0.74 with probability 0.5, and rf = 1. The top
right panel has γ = 3.11, α = 0.758. Lower left panel has γ = 3.11, α = 0.5. Lower right
panel has γ = 3.11, α = 0.758, rf = 1.04, and u ∼ logN(0.085, 0.16).
Figure 3.4 shows the value of the objective for the two possible decisions
for δ as a function of the current price P1 of the stock. Because we want to
analyze the sensitivity of the outcome for the choice of parameters, Figure 3.4
plots the results for different sets of parameter values.
The situation P1 = 40 in the top left panel gives the results for the exact
situation presented by Shefrin and Statman (1985). In this panel the stock
return is +25% or -25%, both with probability 1/2. For P1 equal to   40,
this matches the specification of uncertainty that is considered by Shefrin
and Statman. Also, the parameter values in the value function v(·) are
those estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In the panel, we see
that for a small region below and for a larger region above a stock price
of 50, the line for δ = 0 lies above that of δ = 1, i.e., it is optimal to
sell the stock. For P1 < 43, holding the stock is just slightly better than
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selling it. Hence, we must conclude that the claim that the disposition effect
is a straightforward consequence of the estimated behavioral value function
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), is incorrect. There is a large range of stock
prices for which selling is optimal, but it is not confined to ranges above the
initial price of 50. The difference in objective for the range in which holding
the stock is optimal, appears too small to be of any significance in an actual
decision situation.
Again, it is possible that the parameter values γ = 2.25 and α = 0.88 are
not suitable for an investment situation. Therefore, the upper right panel
shows the solutions when only the parameter values are changed to those
estimated by Shumway (1997). The pattern of the solution remains the
same.
It is possible that the ex-ante intuitive appeal of Shefrin and Statman’s
claim lies in the way they visualize the S-shape, suggesting it to be more
curved than is justified for realistic parameter values. Therefore, the lower
left panel has parameter values γ = 3.11, α = 0.5. These values give the
value function a distinct S-shape, as can be observed from the solid line for
δ = 0 in the figure. For this strongly curved objective function the panel
reveals the behavior that is worded in the citation quote above. For stock
prices below 48, holding the stock is clearly preferred. Above P1 = 50, the
valuation for selling the stock clearly exceeds that of holding on to it.
To complete the analysis, the lower right panel gives the results for a
stock return distribution that is more realistic than the distribution that was
used for the other panels. In contrast with the upper panels, here the largest
difference between holding and selling is in the range of losses. Below 50,
holding on to the stock gives significantly higher value. For prices above
50, however, the difference in valuation between the two outcomes is only
marginal. Concluding, the results from our straightforward investment model
does not give firm support nor completely discards the claim from Shefrin
and Statman. It shows that the outcome crucially depends on the parameter
values and specification of uncertainty that one wants to consider. Added to
the V-shaped optimal decision rules that were found at the beginning of this
section, we have shown that for more realistic distributions of stock returns
the behavior that they assume does not really exist.
We conclude our discussion with two problems associated with the actual
application of the value function in the setting of financial planning, namely
representativeness and normative desirability. With regard to the first, we
doubt whether the laboratory setting in which Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
estimated the value function is representative for a typical investment situ-
ation. In the laboratory experiments, 25 graduate students from Berkeley
and Stanford university “with no special training in decision theory” were
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selected. Each student was paid   25 for participation. Many decision makers
in investment, however, are professionals that have been trained and/or are
experienced to make investment decisions given the uncertainty of financial
markets. Also, the amounts at stake in investment are generally a large mul-
tiple of   25. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine students participating in an
experiment in which it is possible to actually suffer a substantial monetary
loss. However, this possibility is a reality in many investment situations.
Another issue is whether the decisions people take are the result of ratio-
nal thinking, or that in some situations people actually lack “self-control”, a
term used by Shefrin and Statman (1985). See also Hirshleifer (2001), who
discusses the role of self-control and social interactions in financial decisions.
Thaler and Shefrin (1981) go as far as modeling the lack of self-control as part
of an agency problem, boiling down to an intra-personal conflict between a
rational part and an emotional part of one’s self. Specifically with regard to
the value function (3.1), it is difficult to imagine this value function being
selected as an objective function in an optimization framework for a finan-
cial planner. The behavioral value function only seems useful for empirical
research in finance, and not for the normative area of financial planning. In
that situation, a decision maker would be forced to make a normative state-
ment on suitable preferences, and it seems more likely that he would select
an objective function that has an increasing marginal penalty on losses. This
idea is confirmed by the widespread use of downside deviation as risk mea-
sure in applied Asset/Liability Management studies. The next section will
consider a downside risk measure that puts an increasing marginal penalty
on losses.
3.3 Quadratic shortfall
The analysis in Chapter 2 involved a downside risk measure that was linear
in shortfall. Subsection 3.2 explored the consequences of replacing the linear
penalty with a convex penalty in losses. In this section, we analyze a down-
side risk-measure that is concave in losses, i.e., it puts an increasing marginal
penalty on losses. Such risk measures overcome the conceptual problems on
representativeness and normative desirability we raised in the previous sec-
tion. For that reason, they are heavily used in Asset/Liability Management
and other areas of investment.
Using a risk measure that is concave in losses is recommended in for ex-
ample Sortino and Van der Meer (1991) and Harlow (1991). Specifically, they
argue that downside deviation, or semideviation, as it is called by Markowitz
(1959), is the risk measure to be used in investment. It is also in Boender
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(1997) and in the practice of Asset/Liability Management, see Ziemba and
Mulvey (1998).
Our aim is to determine if and how the V-shaped asset allocation policies
persist if the risk measure becomes quadratic shortfall. To do so, we analyze
a one-period investment model as before, but now with an objective function
that penalizes squared shortfall below a benchmark level of wealth. The
formulation of the objective is
max
X0
E[W1]− ν · E
[
({WB −W1}
+)2
]
. (3.7)
The transition of W1 is again given by
W1 = W0 · rf +X0 · (u1 − rf ), (3.8)
where WB represents benchmark wealth, W1 final wealth, X
∗
0 the investment
in the risky asset, u the return on the risky asset, and rf the risk-free rate.
The parameter ν represents loss aversion with respect to the level W B, and
has a similar interpretation as λ in the mean-shortfall model of Chapter 2.
Figure 3.5 shows the objective in (3.7) as a function of final wealth W1,
together with the mean-shortfall objective from Chapter 2. In the figure, we
can see that the fit is not as good as for the Kahneman-Tversky objective
in Figure 3.1. The quadratic shortfall objective has a distinctly different
(concave) shape on the loss side.
Define S0 = W0−W
B/rf as the level of initial surplus. The main results
for the model with squared shortfall objective are in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1 For ν > 0, the optimal solution X∗0 to problem (3.7) has
the following properties:
(i) The optimal stock investment X∗0 for zero surplus (S0 = 0) is positive,
decreasing in ν, and given by
X∗0 =
E[u− rf ]
2ν · E[(rf − u)+]2
. (3.9)
(ii) The decision rule for X∗0 as a function of S0 has one minimum for a
non-positive surplus. For any ν, the location of the minimum is char-
acterized by
Xmin0 =
rf
rf − u¯m
Smin0 , (3.10)
where u¯m is the u¯ > rf that solves∫ u¯
0
(u− rf)dG = 0. (3.11)
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Figure 3.5: Squared shortfall vs. linear shortfall
This figure plots the mean-shortfall objective and mean-squared
shortfall objective functions as a function of the final surplus S1.
λ = 5, ν = 1
For surplus lower than Smin0 , X
∗
0 is decreasing in S0. Above S
min
0 , X
∗
0
is increasing in S0.
(iii) For a positive surplus, and ν →∞, X∗0 = S0.
For a negative surplus, and ν →∞, X∗0 is given by
X∗0 =
rf
rf − u¯∗
S0, (3.12)
where u¯∗ > rf is the u¯ that solves∫ u¯
0
(rf − u)dG =
1
rf − u¯
∫ u¯
0
(u− rf)
2dG. (3.13)
Moreover, for a negative surplus, X∗0 is smaller than for the mean-
shortfall objective.
Proof: See appendix.
Theorem 3.3.1 gives specific properties of the solution, without specifying
a parametric decision rule for the optimal X∗0 as a function of S0. In the
following, we discuss the results one by one, comparing them with the results
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in Theorem 2.3.1 that gives the optimal solution to the mean-shortfall model.
Remarkably, the existence of a bounded solution does not depend on a lower
bound on ν, due to the concavity in losses.
First, equation (3.9) shows that the optimal investment in the risky as-
set is non-zero at zero surplus. Looking at Figure 3.5, we see that this is
caused by the marginal penalty on a loss being very small for losses close to
zero. This is different from the mean-shortfall objective, where the marginal
penalty is constant regardless of the distance to the benchmark. A large
value of ν, however, will drive X∗0 to zero.
Second, the implication of Theorem 3.3.1(ii) is that the optimal invest-
ment in the risky asset has a V-shaped1 relation with the surplus S0. For
different values of ν, the minima of the V-shapes lie on a straight line through
the point with S0 = X
∗
0 = 0. Equation (3.11) resembles the first-order con-
dition for the mean-shortfall model in equation (2.4). Given that for the
mean-shortfall model X0 = 0 for S0 = 0, and given the non-zero minimum
investment Xmin0 for the quadratic shortfall case, the implication is that for
each value of ν and λ there is an area around S0 = 0, where the investment
in the risky asset is higher in the squared-shortfall model than in the linear
shortfall model.
The limiting behavior for X∗0 when ν → ∞ in (iii) shows that for large
values of ν, both sides of the V-shape become linear in the surplus. For
positive surplus, the optimal X∗0 is just equal to the surplus, as the aversion
to downside risk has become too large. For negative surplus, however, the
solution converges to an allocation that gives minimum quadratic shortfall.
Although smaller than in the linear shortfall case, the investment in the risky
asset does not go to zero for negative surplus. Such behavior may be desired
by regulators. Ex ante intuition might say that high loss aversion induces
low-risk allocations. This is clearly not true if one starts in a situation of
shortfall.
Figure 3.6 shows the numerical solutions to model (3.7) given three dif-
ferent values of ν. It illustrates the results in the theorem, and also shows
the typical shapes of the optimal decision rules, together with an idea of the
sensitivity of the optimal solution to ν.
With respect to the V-shapes in Figure 3.6, we see that the the right-hand
side of the V is more sensitive to changes in ν than the left-hand side. For
ν = 10 we see a piecewise linear V-shape, the limiting behavior suggested by
the theorem.
Compared with linear shortfall as a risk measure, squared shortfall in-
1Strictly speaking, the relation does not have to be V-shaped, but we will use the term
for consistency, denoting a general U-shaped figure.
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Figure 3.6: Solution for the quadratic-loss objec-
tive
This figure shows the optimal stock investment as a function of
initial surplus for the quadratic-loss objective and different values
of ν. Benchmark is WB = 104, rf = 1.04, and u ∼logN(0.085,
0.16). The added line goes through the minima of the decision
rules.
duces less extreme-risk allocations for surplus values not too close to 0. Even
for very small values of loss aversion, the slopes of the optimal decision rules
remain quite stable, while for linear shortfall the slopes of the V-shape are
very sensitive to changes in loss aversion. Using squared shortfall as a risk
measure ensures a smoother investment policy than with linear shortfall.
3.4 Extra kink
Until now, the objective functions all had one feature in common, having
one benchmark or reference point that represented a target level of wealth.
The drawback of limiting the formulation to such objectives is that it does
not take into account possible aversion against future shortfall below current
wealth. The existence of such aversion becomes evident in the popularity of
financial products that give a guarantee on (part of) the invested amount.
Therefore, in this section an extra benchmark is added to the mean-shortfall
objective as introduced in Chapter 2. The added benchmark lies at the risk-
free wealth level in the next period. Again formulated as a one-period model,
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the objective becomes
max
X0
E[W1]− λ1 · E[(W
B −W1)
+]− λ2 · E[(W0rf −W1)
+], (3.14)
where λ2 ≥ 0 is a new penalty parameter, penalizing the shortfall below
the risk-free wealth level W0rf . λ1 represents loss aversion with respect to
WB, the benchmark level of wealth, which is independent of initial wealth
W0. The mean-shortfall objective of Chapter 2 is obtained from (3.14) by
setting λ2 = 0. For a positive λ2 the objective function can be visualized
as a piece-wise linear increasing function in W1 with two kinks. The next
theorem presents the solution.
Theorem 3.4.1 With S0 defined as W0 −W
B/rf , the solution to (3.14) is
given by
X∗0 =
rf
rf − u¯
S0, (3.15)
where u¯∗ is one of the u¯s that solve
E[u− rf ]
λ1
−
λ2
λ1
∫ rf
0
(rf − u)dG =
∫ u¯
0
(rf − u)dG. (3.16)
For S0 < 0, u¯
∗ = u¯− > rf , for positive S0, u¯
∗ = u¯+ < rf .
Proof: See appendix
Theorem 3.4.1 shows that the inclusion of an extra kink in the objective at
W0rf , retains analytical tractability. Compared with the first-order condition
for the mean-shortfall model (2.4), the first order condition (3.16) differs only
by a constant term, which is the second term on the left-hand side of (3.16).
We have visualized the solution to equation (3.16) in Figure 3.7. If λ2 = 0,
we are back in the situation of the mean-shortfall model, and the points of
intersection with lines (1) and (3) in the figure give the optimal u¯∗s. For
λ2 > 0, the dashed line (2) decreases with increasing λ2, and the points
of intersection give the u¯s that solve (3.16). For λ2 sufficiently large, we
can drive u¯+ < rf equal to zero, implying that for a positive surplus the
investment in the risky asset is just the level of the surplus. If λ2 increases
even more, there is no u¯+ < rf that solves (3.16). The risky investment
stays unchanged at the surplus as a corner solution to (3.14). For u¯− > rf ,
increasing λ2 drives u¯
− to infinity. The limiting point for λ2 lies at the point
where the left-hand side of (3.16) is equal to −E[u − rf ]. In this case, with
u¯− =∞, the optimal investment in the risky asset is zero, just as for larger
50
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
 0
 0.02
 0.04
 0.06
 0.08
 0.4  0.6  0.8  1  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2
u−
(1)
(2)
(3)
Figure 3.7: Solving the first-order condition
This figure visualizes the solution to equation (3.16). In the figure,
line (1) is the first term on the left-hand side, line (2) is the sum
of the terms on the left-hand side, the curved line (3) is equal
to the right-hand side. Parameter values are rf = 1.04, u ∼
logN(0.085, 0.16), λ1 = 2, and λ2 = 1.33.
values of λ2. Hence, by increasing the penalty parameter λ2 for the second
benchmark W0rf , the left side of the V can become as flat as desired. The
intuition is clear: if the penalty on losing money with respect to the risk-free
investment goes to infinity, the optimal action is to invest all wealth in the
risk-free asset. This amounts to taking ones losses. This is different than
in the linear and squared shortfall case, where λ → ∞ and ν → ∞ induce
a minimum-risk allocation that contains a non-zero investment in the risky
asset.
3.5 Restrictions on asset allocations
There may exist institutional restrictions that limit stock investment to a cer-
tain maximum fraction of total assets. In most Asset/Liability Management
models such restrictions are commonplace.
We study the consequences for the solutions to the mean-shortfall model
from Chapter 2 of imposing restrictions on the asset mix. Recall that the
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Figure 3.8: Optimal one-period solution to the
restricted model
For a one-period model, this figure shows the optimal stock in-
vestment as a function of initial surplus under restriction (3.19).
WB = 104, the stock return u is distributed logN(0.085, 0.16),
rf = 1.04, λ = 5.
optimization model is given by
max
X0,...,XT−1
E0[WT ]− λ · E0
[
(WBT −WT )
+
]
, (3.17)
s.t. Wt+1 = Wt · rf +Xt · (ut+1 − rf), t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (3.18)
see Section 2.2.
Define a cap on the fraction invested in the risky asset, denoted by xu. In
a one-period model, i.e., T = 1, the restriction to have a maximum fraction
of stocks is formulated as
X0 ≤ x
u ·W0. (3.19)
For such a simple one-period restriction, the consequences are straightfor-
ward. If the unrestricted optimal fraction X∗0/W0 is strictly smaller than
xu, X∗0 is also the optimal solution for the restricted model. If it is larger
than xu, the restriction in (3.19) becomes binding, and X∗0 = x
u ·W0. For
different values of xu, optimal solutions to the restricted model are visualized
in Figure 3.8.
However, if T > 1 and the restriction on the asset mix holds for any time
t during the planning period, i.e.,
Xt ≤ x
u ·Wt, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (3.20)
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Figure 3.9: Optimal solution at t = 0 for the
permanent cap.
For a two-period model, this figure presents the amount invested
in the risky asset at time 0 for different permanent caps on the
fraction invested in the risky asset. Presented is the solution to
a model with u1, u2 both distributed logN(0.085, 0.16), W
B =
108.16, rf = 1.04, and λ = 10.
then the resulting X∗t can not be determined in a straightforward manner
for all t. At time T − 1, the solution is still the capped optimal solution
at xu · WT−1. At times t < T − 1, however, the optimal solution is not
only driven by having a current cap on stock investment, but also by the
prospect of limited decision freedom in future periods. The optimal X∗t s
in the unrestricted mean-shortfall model are only optimal given the future
possible recourse actions. Hence, if the space of possible future actions is
restricted, the current decision is bound to change.
To show the consequence of a persistent cap on the fraction invested in
stock, Figure 3.9 shows the optimal stock investment in terms of amounts in
the risky asset at time 0.
We observe that in the case of a cap in both periods, initial stock invest-
ment is strictly smaller than in the unrestricted model for all wealth levels.
This is caused by the fact that losses in future periods cannot be followed by
an optimal unrestricted investment in stocks.
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3.6 Conclusions
This chapter has considered several extensions to the framework of Chap-
ter 2. The results for the Kahneman-Tversky value function revealed both
conceptual problems as well as problems with unbounded solutions. These
results suggest that the Kahneman-Tversky value function combined with the
parameter values estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) or Shumway
(1997) is not useful in a setting of financial planning. However, one can
consider the value function to be of use in research that looks at empiri-
cal behavior in an investment situation. In that case, the resulting optimal
stock investment for a somewhat larger loss aversion parameter was insight-
ful. It showed that for bounded solutions a clear V-shape can be found in
the decision rule.
Another downside risk measure was analyzed in the case of squared short-
fall. The convex loss penalty has desirable properties for application in fi-
nancial planning. At the outset, it seemed possible that the V-shapes that
were found for the mean-shortfall model, and persisted for the Kahneman-
Tversky case, would disappear. The results showed otherwise. Numerical
solutions to the mean-quadratic shortfall model showed investment patterns
with clear V-shapes again. Although analytical tractability of the complete
solution was not possible, we were able to give additional properties of the
solution.
In addition to loss aversion for wealth below a fixed benchmark, Sec-
tion 3.4 added a benchmark level at current wealth to the shortfall risk-
measure. With the extra loss aversion parameter, risk-taking at negative
surpluses can be driven to zero. The V-shape disappears.
Adding a restriction on the allowed fraction invested in the risky asset first
of all bounds the V-shape from above. Second, in a multi-period framework
the slope of the decision rule becomes lower, as the space for future recourse
actions is limited.
Concluding, this chapter has made the point that the mean-shortfall
model of Chapter 2 can be seen as a benchmark case for a larger class of
loss averse models. We were able to use the same analytical techniques to
find properties of the optimal solution, and established direct links between
the difference in the specification of the objective and the resulting decision
rules. The V-shape of stock investments as a function of initial wealth or
surplus appears a persistent phenomenon if agents are loss averse.
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Appendix
3.A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1:
The maximization problem to solve is
max
X0
E[W1]− νE[({W
B −W1}
+)2], (3A.1)
where W1 = W0rf +X0 · (u− rf ). The first order condition to this problem
can be written as
E[u− rf ]− 2νrfS0
∫ u¯
0
(u− rf )dG− 2νX0
∫ u¯
0
(u− rf )
2dG = 0, (3A.2)
where S0 = W0 −W
B/rf , and u¯ is defined as
u¯ = −
S0rf
X0
+ rf , (3A.3)
giving the return for which W1 = W
B. The second order condition is given
by
−2ν
∫ u¯
0
(u− rf)
2dG < 0, (3A.4)
which is satisfied for ν > 0.
We prove the four parts of the theorem separately.
(i) If S0 = 0, u¯ = rf , so equation (3A.2) simplifies to
E[u− rf ]− 2νX0
∫ rf
0
(u− rf)
2dG = 0. (3A.5)
The left-hand side of (3A.5) is a linear equation in X0, with solution
X∗0 =
E[u− rf ]
2νE[(rf − u)+]2
, (3A.6)
which establishes that X∗0 at zero surplus is positive and decreasing in
ν.
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(ii) Given the first-order condition (3A.2) and using the implicit function
theorem, the derivative of X∗0 with respect to S0 is given by
∂X∗0
∂S0
= −
∂F/∂S0
∂F/∂X0
, (3A.7)
where we have used F (·) to denote the derivative of the objective func-
tion with respect to X0, being the left-hand side of (3A.2). From the
second-order condition in 3A.4 we know that the denominator of (3A.7)
is negative. The numerator is given by
∂F
∂S0
= −2νrf
∫ u¯
0
(u− rf)dG, (3A.8)
which is zero for u¯ = 0 and a u¯m > rf . We can ignore the case u¯ = 0, as
u¯ ↓ 0 is only a solution to the first order condition (3A.2) if ν →∞, or
|S0| → ∞. From the definition of u¯ in (3A.3) and the fact that u¯
m > rf
it follows that the surplus at whichX∗0 = X
min
0 lies at a negative surplus.
Combining (3A.2) with (3A.8), an alternative expression for Xmin0 is
given by
Xmin0 =
E[u− rf ]
2ν
∫ u¯m
0
(u− rf )2dG
. (3A.9)
From the second-order derivative ∂2F/∂S20 , which is positive, we find
that Xmin0 is the minimum investment in the risky asset.
With respect to the sign of X∗0 , note that from (i) we have that for
X∗0 (S0 = 0) > 0. Since we have that ∂X
∗
0/∂S0 is a continuous function
of S0, and X0 = 0 does not solve the first order condition (3A.2), we
find that X∗0 is positive.
(iii) Dividing the left-hand side expression of the first-order condition (3A.2)
by 2νS0rf gives
E[u− rf ]
2rfνS0
−
∫ u¯
0
(u− rf)dG+
1
u¯− rf
∫ u¯
0
(u− rf)
2dG = 0. (3A.10)
For S0 6= 0 and ν →∞, the expression in (3A.10) simplifies to∫ u¯
0
(rf − u)dG =
1
rf − u¯
∫ u¯
0
(u− rf)
2dG, (3A.11)
which depends on rf and G(·) only. As (3A.11) does not include terms
W0 or X0, we find that in the limit, X
∗
0 is determined by the u¯s that
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Figure 3.10: Solutions to equation (3A.11)
This figure shows the left-hand(1) and right-hand(2) side of equa-
tion (3A.11), as a function of u¯. rf = 1.04, u ∼ logN(0.085, 0.16).
solve (3A.11). For given parameter values, Figure 3.10 shows the left-
and right-hand side of equation (3A.11), as a function of u¯. There is
a clear point of intersection for u¯ > rf . For u¯ < rf , the left-hand side
of (3A.11) is smaller than the right-hand side, so for u¯ < rf it solves
only for u¯ = 0, corresponding to X∗0 = S0.
To compare X∗0 for a negative surplus and ν →∞ with the one in the
mean-shortfall model for λ → ∞, observe that in the mean-shortfall
case, the limiting first-order condition is in equation (3A.11), but with
right-hand side equal to zero. With u¯− > rf , for a negative surplus the
right-hand side of (3A.11) is negative, so the limiting u¯∞ is larger than
in the mean-shortfall model. From the definition of u¯ it follows that
the limiting X∗0 is smaller than in the mean-shortfall model.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1
We start by rewriting the optimization problem (3.14) as
max
X0
W0rf +X0E[u− rf ]− λ1 ·
∫ u¯
0
WB −W0rf −X0(u− rf )dG
− λ2
∫ rf
0
WB −W0rf −X0(u− rf)dG,
(3A.12)
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where u¯ is defined as
u¯ =
WB −W0rf
X0
+ rf . (3A.13)
Using Leibniz’ rule, the first order condition to this problem is given by
E[u− rf ] + λ1
∫ u¯
0
u− rfdG+ λ2
∫ rf
0
u− rfdG = 0. (3A.14)
The result follows by observing that this condition is the same as that for
the model in Chapter 2, except for the added third term in (3A.14). This
term, however, does not depend on S0 or X
∗
0 , so the rest of the proof is the
same of that for the mean-shortfall model, see the proof of Theorem 2.3.1.
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4Optimal Pension Fund Investment
Management
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we simultaneously provide a generalization and interpretation
of the model in Chapter 2. We generalize the model to incorporate stochastic
liabilities, interpreting the model in a setting of Asset-Liability Management
for pension funds.
In recent years the strategic investment policy by Dutch pension funds
has to be supported by a so-called Asset/Liability Management(ALM) study.
In the context of pension funds these studies give insight into the expected
cost and risk aspects of investment and contribution policies. This way, an
ALM study serves as a foundation of contribution and investment policies
toward employers, workers, pensioners and regulator. Even in cases where
ALM studies are not compulsory, they are used heavily by financial insti-
tutions, such as banks, insurance companies and pension funds, see Ziemba
and Mulvey (1998) for an extensive overview of the use of and research into
ALM.
An important feature of any financial planning model such as used in
ALM is the objective function. In the objective function, risk and return
measures have to be specified to be able to make inferences on the desirability
of policies under consideration. For a long time, the financial world has
settled on the use of the mean and variance of investment returns to measure
performance. The developments of the last decade, however, have lead to
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using more explicit risk measures in ALM objectives. This is where the
research of the previous chapters and the area of Asset/Liability Management
coincide.
Dutch pension funds are the most likely candidates to apply a loss averse
framework to. First, they actively use Asset/Liability Management in their
financial planning process. In fact, doing an ALM study is mandatory for
the motivation of investment policy in The Netherlands. For an overview of
ALM and pension funds, see Boender and Vos (2000). Dert (1995) provides
a characteristic example, modeling the ALM problem for pension funds as a
stochastic programming model. Second, the risk measures that are used in
most ALM studies are down-side risk measures. These risk-measures can be
seen as representing loss averse preferences directly. The use of down-side
risk measures in a defined benefit context is widespread. See for example
Sortino and Van der Meer (1991), Harlow (1991), and Boender (1997).
In comparison with other studies of portfolio management for pension
funds, Randall and Satchell (1997) is a good example of a traditional analy-
sis. They compare the efficiency of different portfolios for pension fund assets
with respect to the mean and variance of the return. This has the advantage
of being able to use the standard toolkit of mean-variance analysis as devel-
oped by Markowitz (1952) in his CAPM. The disadvantage, however, is that
it does not take into account that pension funds experience a serious downside
when returns are (too) low. This is even acknowledged by the authors, who
note that pension funds cannot afford “to lose a huge amount of money, even
if they are frequently making small amounts of money. This asymmetry is
not accounted for by a model which is defined over mean and variance only.”
Their analysis also prohibits an inference on how the investment decision
depends on the (initial) financial position of the fund.
A good illustration of the predominant technical approach to Asset/Liability
Management in the literature is given by Zenios (1995). He considers the
computational problems of solving stochastic programming formulations for
Asset/Liability Management in a fixed-income environment. Although one
of the models he considers includes penalty parameters for the downside and
upside deviation of the portfolio return, most attention is paid to a multi-
period model in which the utility of the investor is given by a traditional
iso-elastic function, e.g., power utility. Clearly, the paper is not focused on
the structure of the optimal decisions with respect to risk and return, but
rather on the computational and model building aspects. See also Kusy and
Ziemba (1986), Hiller and Eckstein (1993), Maranas et al. (1997) and Zenios
et al. (1998).
The setup of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2 we interpret the
mean-shortfall model of Chapter 2 in terms of a defined-benefit pension fund.
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Section 4.3 derives implications for pension fund investment policy in a rel-
evant setting, and considers the sensitivity of the results to the specification
of uncertainty. The sensitivity analysis is repeated for a model with down-
side deviation as the risk measure in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5 we explore
empirical evidence of loss averse preferences for pension funds by examining
actual pension fund investment policies. Section 4.6 ends with a discussion
and conclusions.
4.2 Pension funding as a mean-shortfall opti-
mization
Recall the formulation of the mean-shortfall model that we analyzed in Chap-
ter 2. As a T period optimization problem, it is given by
max
X0,...,Xt−1
E[WT ]− λ · E[(W
B −WT )
+], (4.1)
s.t. Wt+1 = Wtrf +Xt · (ut − rf), t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (4.2)
where Wt represents wealth at time t, rf the risk-free (gross) return, ut the
uncertain return over period t, WB the benchmark wealth at the horizon and
λ the loss aversion parameter. Furthermore, we find it convenient to define
WB0 as the risk-free discounted benchmark, given by W
B/rTf .
Formulation of the objective
By choosing linear shortfall as down-side risk measure and not, for example,
quadratic shortfall, the relation with the results of Chapter 2 is most clearly
visible. However, since ALM studies predominantly use downside deviation
as a risk-measure, the sensitivity of the results is analyzed in Section 4.4.
Note that the results in Chapter 3 have already shown that the general
shape of the solution to the model in (4.1) and (4.2) is the same for linear
and quadratic shortfall.
A severe limitation of the objective function in (4.1) is that it is one-
dimensional, i.e., it is defined in terms of the single variable WT . The real
objective for a benefit-defined fund, however, consists of several competing
objectives. Typical objectives are: minimal contributions, maximal index-
ation of pensions, and minimal risk with respect to funding. With respect
to the latter, the key ratio that is reported as a measure of financial sound-
ness of a fund is the actuarial funding ratio. It is simply the value of assets
divided by the present value of the liabilities, W0/W
B
0 . Another measure is
the surplus, which can be defined as W0 −W
B
0 . Now, if the funding ratio
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(or surplus) is high, the risk of underfunding is low, the contribution level
can be lowered, and indexation can fully compensate for inflation. Hence, in
the simple model of pension fund investment, we use an ALM objective that
is only defined in terms of the surplus of the fund, which has a 1-1 relation
with the funding ratio. If the surplus is high, the other objectives are met
at the same time. If the surplus is low, or if there is a deficit, the associ-
ated consequences are carried over to the other objectives, e.g., for a fund
with a low funding level, contributions are raised and indexation might be
postponed. See Boender and Vos (2000) for an analysis of the mechanism of
allocating financial risks over multiple objectives for a pension fund, which
they call risk-budgeting.
Leibowitz et al. (1992) model shortfall-aversion of pension funds by in-
corporating a shortfall constraint on the ‘surplus return’. The asset returns
are then analyzed in a mean-variance setting. Additionally, a “surplus re-
turn” is defined as the ratio of surplus growth divided by the initial value
of liabilities. Their definition of this return implies that their subsequent
mean-variance analysis is equivalent to having a constraint on the amount of
surplus shortfall. Their setting can be compared with our objective function
in (4.1) by interpreting λ as a Lagrange-multiplier, whose value depends on
initial wealth W0. The problem with such a setup is that there is not always
a solution possible. Also, in our framework of two assets, any feasible solu-
tion would be trivial: invest the maximum amount in stocks, such that the
shortfall constraint is binding. The usefulness of their approach is that they
explicitly reckon with the duration of pension liabilities versus the duration
of available fixed-income instruments.
Interpretation of the parameters
The symbols rf and ut represent the returns on the investment categories
available to the fund. In practice, pension funds will invest in more than
only two categories, but we have seen in Chapter 2 that the two-asset case
generalizes to that of more assets. Wt is a natural representation for the total
value of assets of the fund.
Interpreting WB is key to the present chapter. It is the reference level
relative to which either a gain or a loss is measured. For a benefit-defined
pension fund, a natural candidate for the reference level is the value of the
liabilities that needs to be covered at time T . The liabilities of a pension
fund consist of the pension rights built-up by the contributors. The value of
these rights can be computed by discounting the future pension payments.
In the Dutch system, future pension payments are discounted at an actuarial
discount rate of 4%. As such the present value of future payments can be
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computed, resulting in the liability value for the fund. WB can be interpreted
as the discounted value at time T of the guaranteed pension payments at
times T+1 and further. This is not all that can be said of the computation of
the liabilities. Subection 4.3.3 discusses an alternative method, and explores
the consequences in terms of our model.
There are several factors that influence the liabilities of a defined-benefit
pension fund, WB in our model. In the following, we consider only one factor,
namely price inflation. This is the key variable of interest for a pension fund,
as it influences the real value of pensions. In general, pension funds aim
to cover the decrease in real value of nominal pension rights by applying
indexation. That brings about a direct link between price inflation and the
nominal level of the liabilities, WB. Note that it is possible to consider
other variables influencing the level WB, such as the career developments of
individual (active) members, and wage inflation.
The effect of price inflation on WB is modeled by introducing a variable
pi, representing inflation over the period of optimization. Defining the real
pension obligations at the end date as WBreal, the nominal reference point
WB is determined as
WB = (1 + pi) ·WBreal, (4.3)
where 1+pi is the gross inflation factor, assuming annual compounding. The
setup in (4.3) makes it easy to study the effect of inflation on the optimal
solution. It can also make clear the way that current regulation sees the val-
uation of liabilities. Under the current Dutch regulation, nominal liabilities
are discounted at a rate of 4%. It is difficult to find a formal rationale of this
method, but the opinion seems to be that 4% is a reasonable proxy for the
long-term real rate of interest1. Using equation (4.3) and the definition of
WB0 , we can see that if the level of liabilities is multiplied by inflation, i.e.,
full indexation, the actuarial interest rate of 4% corresponds to a nominal
risk-free return of (1 + pi) · 1.04.
Planning horizon
We choose the horizon T equal to 15 years, intended to match the duration
of the liabilities of an average pension fund. The choice for the static model
excludes the possibility of policy changes between time 0 and T . Thus, the
decision X∗0 gives an an initial asset mix that is optimal over the whole
planning period. Strategies in ALM studies are often also static rather than
dynamic. The static model is straightforward to analyze, and we have seen
1Note that insurance companies currently use 3%.
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that its solution is representative for the solution to the multistage model,
see Chapter 2.
In an attempt to explain the equity premium puzzle, Benartzi and Thaler
(1995) postulate that investors and pension funds are loss averse and myopic,
i.e., T is equal to 1 year. They motivate the suggestion of myopia by pointing
out that investors account for their gains and losses at the end of each year.
The only evidence they give, however, is that the average asset mix from their
model is comparable to the average mix found in their dataset of institutional
investors. Besides the debatable evidence, at the outset myopia is unrealistic
for pension funds. Pension fund managers frequently express their view that
they are, and should be, long-term investors, and should not be pinned down
on 1-year performance figures. This view is consistent with the practice of
motivating investment policies by ALM studies that calculate risk and return
over a long-term horizon.
Shortfall risk
The objective function in (4.1) involves the maximization of wealth (or sur-
plus), with a penalty on the expected amount of deficit below 100% actuarial
funding. loss aversion with respect to deficits below WB represents that, in a
defined-benefit system, the liabilities need to be covered by available assets.
The formulation in (4.1) allows for a deficit. The parameter λ represents
the aversion to shortfall. In the context of pension funds, the extent of loss
aversion is influenced by the fund’s flexibility in a situation of underfunding.
A fund with much flexibility with regard to contribution rises, additional
capital injections by the sponsor, lowering of pension rights, and skipping of
indexation, might be less loss averse than a fund that does not have such
flexibility.
A problem with incorporating loss aversion in the objective of a pension
fund, is that there is an obligation by law that the current value of all pension
liabilities should always be covered by available assets. The Dutch law on
pensions, the PSF (Pensioen- en Spaarfondsenwet), stipulates in article 9a
sub 1 that “the assets of a pension fund should ... be sufficient to cover
the pension liabilities.” This constitutes the most serious financial check
that is to be performed by the regulator, the PVK (pensions and insurance
supervisory authority of The Netherlands). Note that by interpreting W B
as the level of pension liabilities, the situation WT < W
B is against the law.
However, the possibility of underfunding is a reality, and the present Chapter
will provide insight in optimal behavior when a fund is in a situation of a
deficit.
An additional obligation for most pension funds is the statutory commit-
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ment to safeguard the real value of pensions, by means of providing indexation
on accrued pension rights. Such indexation can usually be postponed if the
financial position of the fund does not allow it, but if the position gets better
in the future the fund first needs to apply the postponed indexation.
4.3 Results
In Subsection 4.3.1, inflation pi is assumed constant. We take rf such that
the actuarial discount rate of 4% is correct. Subsection 4.3.2 specifies a joint
probability distribution of inflation and the stock return, while Section 4.3.3
considers the consequences of having a risk-free rate that is not in accordance
with the actuarial assumption of a real rate of 4%.
4.3.1 Base case
In the most simple case, we assume that WBreal, the real level of liabilities
at time 1, is known with certainty at time t = 0. In other words, inflation
pi is a known constant. As the planning horizon is 15 years, a reasonable
assumption for the expectation of inflation is 2% per year, the inflation target
for the European Central Bank(ECB). That makes WB = (1.02)T ·WBreal.
Assuming that the current practice of using an actuarial discount rate of
4% for nominal liabilities is valid, we set rf = (1 + 6.1%)
T . To see the
effect, observe that a real liability of 180 at time T has a present value of
180 · (1.02/1.061)T = 180/1.04T = 100. The only uncertainty in the model
comes from the return on the risky asset u. As in Chapter 2, we take u to
have a lognormal probability distribution with an average return of 10% and
standard deviation of 17%, representing typical historical figures for stock
returns.
To solve model (4.1), we discretize the distribution of u using 500 points,
and find the optimal stock investment through numerical optimization with
Gams. Doing this for different values of the initial wealth W0 results in
pairs (W0, X
∗). Figure 4.1 shows the resulting optimal fractions X∗/W0 as a
function of W0 for different values of the loss aversion parameter λ. Table 4.1
lists the values of λ and the associated probabilities of shortfall.
From Figure 4.1 we can observe the typical V-shape that we have seen
in earlier chapters. In the pension fund context this figure has an important
consequence. Pension funds usually use an ALM study to support an invest-
ment policy that is aimed at holding a “strategic mix”. The figure shows,
however, that the optimal initial asset mix for the 15 year period depends
on the initial funding ratio.
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Figure 4.1: Optimal fraction invested in stocks for the base case
This figure shows the optimal investment in stock as a fraction of initial wealth against
the funding ratio for different values of the loss aversion parameter λ. T = 15
Table 4.1: The values of λ used to compute the
optimal investment decisions in Figure 4.1
The second column lists the probability of underfunding, given a
positive initial surplus. The third column gives the probability
that the final surplus is positive, given a negative initial surplus.
λ P(underfunding) P(overfunding)
15.2 10% 16.8%
26 5% 11.8%
110 1% 7.8%
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In terms of the funding ratio of the pension fund, the interpretation of the
figure is as follows. For a funding ratio of 100%, the future nominal pension
payments can be fully guaranteed. In this case, the optimal allocation does
not contain stocks. We call this point the minimum-risk portfolio.
At a funding ratio of more than 100%, the surplus asset value leads to an
increasingly higher fraction in stocks, thus using the risk premium on stock
investment to make the fund even wealthier (in expectation).
At funding ratios below 100%, stock investments increase in the extent
of underfunding. When the pension liabilities cannot be guaranteed with
certainty anymore, the fund has to take risk to prevent a further erosion of
the pension claims. A higher percentage in stocks is the only way to reach
the benchmark WB with positive probability. In a real-world setting, an
alternative to increasing X can be an increased contribution from the side
of the sponsor, or a more frugal pension claim by lowering indexation. Both
alternatives can be visualized as having the effect of shifting the financial
position of the fund to the right on the horizontal axis of Figure 4.1, either
by increasing the numerator or by decreasing the denominator of the funding
ratio.
The loss aversion parameter λ has a decreasing effect on the steepness
of the V-shape in Figure 4.1. A higher loss aversion leads to a safer asset
mix, as the certainty of the risk-free return becomes more attractive than the
possible extra return on stocks. For the rest of this chapter, we take λ = 110,
representing a 1% probability of underfunding.
A marked difference between practice and the model in (4.1) is that in
ALM studies one usually optimizes over a fixed mix, where we optimize over
the initial mix only. The optimal policy that is plotted in Figure 4.1 can
be labeled as a ‘buy-and-hold’-policy, i.e., after the initial mix is set, the
fraction invested in stocks only changes with the returns that are made. To
analyze the consequences of this assumption, we perform a hybrid simula-
tion/optimization as in Boender (1997)2 to find the optimal fixed-mix policy
for the model in (4.1). The results are in Figure 4.2, which shows the optimal
fraction of stocks for the buy-and-hold against the fixed-mix alternative.
We see that the V-shape is retained for the fixed-mix policy, although
the initial allocation is different. For the fixed-mix strategy, the right side of
the V-shape is lower than for the buy-and-hold strategy. To further explore
2The method is in fact a genetic algorithm. Starting from an initial sample of random
asset mixes, stepwise improvements in the best mix are achieved through subsequent
replication and selection steps.
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Figure 4.2: Optimal investment for buy-and-hold
versus fixed-mix
This figure shows the optimal fraction invested in stocks for two
different assumption on the intertemporal rebalancing. The buy-
and-hold strategy implies a choice for an initial asset mix, and
no rebalancing. The fixed-mix strategy implies that the fraction
stocks is rebalanced to the same ratio at the beginning of each
time period 0 < t ≤ T of the planning period.
the difference between the two strategies, consider the risk-return diagram
in Figure 4.3.
To start with the left panel, it turns out that the objective value for a
fund starting in underfunding is higher for the fixed-mix strategy than for
the same asset mix under buy-and-hold. This is because in underfunding
the buy-and-hold strategy induces the exact opposite behavior of what is
dynamically optimal. From Chapter 2 we see that in under a dynamically
optimal strategy, the fraction of stocks should increase if the surplus drops
sufficiently low. Under buy-and-hold, however, if the surplus decreases due
to a fall in stock prices, the fraction invested in stocks decreases as well.
In the right panel, the risk-return curve for the buy-and-hold strategy
is entirely above the fixed mix one. This means that for the same average
shortfall, a higher average surplus is achieved. It explains the difference in
the optimal stock fraction for the right-hand side of the V in Figure 4.2.
An explanation for the effect is that a buy-and-hold policy has an auto-
matic downside protection: even if the initial investment in stocks becomes
worthless, between time 0 and T , the investment in the risk-free asset is left
68
-50
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
Av
er
ag
e 
su
rp
lu
s
Average shortfall
100% stocks
0% stocks
fixed mix
buy and hold
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4  4.5
Av
er
ag
e 
su
rp
lu
s
Average shortfall
100% stocks
0% stocks
fixed mix
buy and hold
Figure 4.3: Risk and return for buy-and-hold versus fixed-mix
For a range of asset mixes, this figure shows the average surplus versus average shortfall,
using 10000 scenarios for the stock return. The left panel has an initial funding ratio of
90%, the right panel of 110%. λ = 110, u ∼ logN(0.085, 0.16), rf = 1.04, T = 15.
unchanged. For the fixed-mix, however, negative stock returns are followed
by a rebalancing to the fixed-mix at the end of each period. With respect to
the upside, under buy-and-hold the fraction in stocks grows proportionally
with the stock return, so the upside potential is larger than under the fixed-
mix policy. The relatively bad performance of a fixed-mix has been pointed
out before in Perold and Sharpe (1988), who note on constant-mix strategies
that “They have less downside protection than, and not as much upside as,
buy-and-hold strategies”.
So far, we have assumed a deterministic value for WB. In the next sub-
section we consider the robustness of the shape of the decision rules to the
introduction of an uncertain inflation rate that influences the level WB.
4.3.2 Uncertainty in inflation
With an uncertain inflation rate pi, and the reference point WB in the ob-
jective function (4.1) becomes a stochastic variable. Log-stock returns and
inflation are modeled as bivariate normal. This way, the covariance matrix
Σ of the logs looks as
Σ =
[
σ2pi ρ · σpiσu
ρ · σpiσu σ
2
u
]
, (4.4)
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between inflation pi and the log-stock
return u. For the stock return we take a mean of 10% and standard deviation
of 17%. These correspond to a normal distribution with µ = 0.085 and
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Figure 4.4: Optimal stock investment under in-
flation uncertainty.
In this figure the optimal stock fractions to problem (4.1) are
plotted for different values for σpi , the standard deviation of the
inflation. λ = 110, T = 15, ρ = 0.
σ = 0.16 for the log-stock return. Mean inflation is again equal to 2% and
rf = 1.061.
Note that if we model inflation as generated by a normal distribution,
negative values will occur. This is not a problem in the model, it only
shows that modeling inflation this way is a crude approximation of the real
probability distribution. As the mean and variance of inflation are based
on historical data, the analysis will also consider alternative values. With
sufficient controversy over the size of the correlation between inflation and
stock returns, the parameter ρ is also varied in the analysis, starting from
a value of zero. To start with, results for varying values of the standard
deviation σpi of inflation are in Figure 4.4.
From Figure 4.4 we observe again the basic pattern from Figure 4.1.
The percentage in stocks has a V-shaped relation with the funding ratio.
The difference with Figure 4.4 is that the kink of the V does not lie at a
zero stock-investment. The minimum-risk portfolio contains stocks. When
inflation can only be hedged partially, the bottom line is that there is always
uncertainty with respect to the level of the final pension payment.
Next, we consider the optimal solution to the loss averse model when the
correlation between stocks and inflation is non-zero. In the long run stocks
are considered a partial hedge for inflation risk. This is one of the motivations
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Figure 4.5: Optimal stock investment for differ-
ent correlation coefficients
In this figure the optimal stock fractions to problem (4.1) are plot-
ted for different values for ρ, the correlation coefficient between
the log-stock return and inflation. σpi = 0.01 λ = 110, T = 15.
for investing in stocks in case of indexed pension claims, see Leibowitz et al.
(1994). Randall and Satchell (1997) find a positive correlation for UK data
of 0.16 between equity and paid-out pensions. However, for Dutch data from
1956 to 1994, Dert (1995) finds an annual negative correlation coefficient of
-0.24 between log-stock returns and price inflation.
Figure 4.5 shows the effect of changes in the correlation ρ between stock
returns and inflation. For a given funding ratio, a higher correlation results
in a larger stock investment. The effect on the investment policy is only
moderate, however. With a yearly correlation of 90%, which is very high,
the maximum difference in fraction stocks compared to no correlation is 15
percentage points. It is surprising that this effect is so limited. As mentioned
before: the presence of correlation between stock returns and inflation moti-
vates stock investment as an inflation hedge. Given that the true correlation
is suggested to lie between 0.1 and 0.5, this motivation seems to be of limited
imporant in practice. The positive risk-premium of stocks is more important
than the effect of a positive correlation with inflation.
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Figure 4.6: Optimal stock fraction for different
values of the risk-free rate
In this figure the solutions to model (4.1) are shown when the
risk-free rate rf is varied. With expected inflation of 2%, the rate
of 6.1% corresponds to a real rate of 4%. T = 1, ρ = 0, σpi = 1%.
4.3.3 Alternative interest rates
Until now, we assumed that the actuarial interest rate of 4% was exactly the
real risk-free interest rate. In this section, a final plot of stock investment
versus the funding ratio is shown, now in a situation where the real rate
differs from 4%.
All earlier calculations assumed that the actuarial interest rate of 4% is a
reasonable representation of the long-term average of the real interest rate.
In this paragraph we extend the analysis to include the fact that the real
interest rate can differ from 4 percent.
A real interest rate other than 4% has a direct effect on the market value
of the liabilities. Valuation of the liabilities according to market value is
finding more ground in the Dutch pension fund sector. Using a real interest
rate lower than 4% gives lower funding ratio, using a higher interest rate
gives a higher funding ratio. To illustrate the consequences of a real interest
rate other than 4%, Figure 4.6 shows the solutions to model (4.1) for varying
values of the risk-free interest rate rf .
From the figure we can observe that the location of the minimum-risk
portfolio, i.e., the bottom of the V-shape, is very sensitive to the value of
the risk-free rate. We know from Chapter 2 that without uncertainty in W B
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the minimum-risk portfolio lies at zero surplus, see also Figure 4.1 of this
section. The wealth level that gives zero surplus equals the discounted value
of the liabilities WB against the risk-free rate rf . A larger rf decreases the
discounted value, a smaller rf increases it. Hence, as the funding ratio on
the x-axis of Figure 4.6 is computed regardless of the true value of rf , the
shift of the V-shape is due to the shift in the risk-free discounted value of the
liabilities.
Note that a low future interest rate is predicted by Chaveau and Loufir
(1997), as cited in Bovenberg (2001). They have studied the effect of the
ageing of the population on the interest rate and predict that the real interest
rate will decline to a level of 3.25% in 2025.
4.4 Downside deviation
The previous section has evaluated the consequences of using different spec-
ifications of uncertainty in the standard mean-shortfall model. The mean-
shortfall model was selected, because it is the most simple loss averse model
with an analytical characterization of the solution in Chapter 2. In the
practice of ALM for pension funds, however, downside deviation is predomi-
nantly used as the risk-measure. This section explores the sensitivity of the
outcomes from Section 4.3 for taking this risk measure. The outcome without
inflation uncertainty has been studied in Chapter 3, Section 3.3. It showed
that for a fixed benchmark, the resulting decision rule has the same shape
as in the mean-shortfall model.
Using downside deviation as a risk-measure boils down to taking quadratic
shortfall. The popularity of its use is due to the fact that it punishes large
losses more than proportionally heavy than small losses. The formulation of
the objective becomes,
max
X0,...,Xt−1
E[WT ]− ν · E([(W
B −WT )
+])2, (4.5)
s.t. Wt+1 = Wtrf +Xt · (ut − rf), t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (4.6)
with the parameters defined as before, and T = 15. The difference with the
objective function (4.1) is the power of 2 in the second term of (4.5). Also,
in accordance with notation of Chapter 3, the loss aversion parameter is now
represented by ν, signaling that the risk-measure is different.
Figure 4.7 shows 4 panels in which the sensitivity analyses of the previous
section are repeated for downside-deviation as the risk measure.
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Figure 4.7: Optimal policies for downside-deviation objective
Top left panel shows the optimal stock investment fraction for different values of the loss
aversion parameter ν, inflation constant at 0.02, ρ = 0, u ∼ logN(0.085, 0.16), rf =
1.061. The values of ν have been chosen to roughly compare with the 1%, 5%, and 10%
probabilities of underfunding, as in Figure 4.1. For ν = 8, the top right panel shows
the solution for different values of the standard deviation of inflation, as in Figure 4.4.
The lower left panel has different values for the correlation between inflation and log-stock
returns, ρ, while σpi is kept at 0.01, compare Figure 4.5. The lower right panel has different
values for the riskfree rate rf , while ρ = 0, and σpi = 0.01.
Starting with the top left panel and comparing with Figure 4.1, we rec-
ognize the effect of the V-shape moving in the upper-left direction. Also,
the left-hand side of the V stays at the same position, the right-hand side is
much more sensitive to values of ν. As the results in the figure do not include
uncertainty for inflation, we can refer to Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation
of the results.
The top-right, and lower-left panel show the effect of uncertainty in in-
flation on the outcomes. We find that σpi and ρ have the same effect on the
decision rule as in the mean-shortfall model. Increasing inflation uncertainty
makes the minimum-risk point of the V-shape shift to the right. Increasing
correlation between inflation and stock returns, the minimum stock alloca-
tion increases, as does the fraction of stocks for positive surpluses. As in
Figure 4.5, the left-hand side of the V is not affected significantly by a posi-
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Table 4.2: Six large Dutch pension funds
This table presents assets and funding ratios for six of the largest
Dutch pension funds. Data is collected from annual reports and
vvb data.
Fund Asset value(bln   ) Funding ratio ultimo 2001
ABP 147.3 1.12
Shell 12.2 1.39
PGGM 49.1 1.12
Philips 14.7 1.28
BPMT 17.5 1.18
SPF 9.9 1.45
tive correlation.
4.5 Empirical evidence
The previous sections have shown the specific investment policies that are
optimal in the loss aversion framework for a stylized pension fund. In this sec-
tion, we seek empirical evidence that can shed light on the question whether
pension funds are loss averse. We present historical data on the actuar-
ial funding ratios and investment portfolios of Dutch pension funds. If loss
aversion is a plausible assumption for the preferences of a pension fund, and
if pension funds invest rationally, then the strategies that are followed should
be comparable with the optimal V-shaped strategies found in this chapter.
In this section we provide data on the actual financial positions of Dutch
pension funds. If pensions funds are loss averse, some of them might already
be on the left-hand side of a V-shaped investment rule. Whether funds’
investment policies actually show such V-shaped behavior is explored in more
detail.
Table 4.2 shows the asset values and funding ratios of six large Dutch
pension funds. ABP is the pension fund for all Dutch government personnel,
and the largest in terms of asset value The Netherlands. The Shell pension
fund is for employees of Royal Dutch Shell. PGGM is the fund for workers in
the health sector. Philips is obviously for Philips workers. BPMT is the fund
for people working in the steel and technical industries. Finally, SPF is the
fund that covers the pension for workers at one of the companies associated
with the Dutch railways. In total, these funds represent 58% of the total of
pension assets in The Netherlands of   435 billion.
All six funds in Table 4.2 are overfunded, i.e., they have a funding ratio
75
Table 4.3: Asset returns 1997-2001
This table gives the yearly stock returns as measured by the MSCI
world index, measured in local currency. Bonds is the Lehman
Brothers Aggregate Bond Index return. Interest is the 1-Year
Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
year MSCI Bonds Interest
1997 20.8% 10.2% 5.6%
1998 19.2% 8.6% 5.1%
1999 26.3% -2.0% 5.1%
2000 -10.8% 9.4% 6.1%
2001 -15.3% 10.4% 3.5%
larger than 100%. We saw in Subsection 4.3.3 that the kink of the V-shape
does not necessarily have to lie at 100% actuarial funding. While there
are worries about the diminishing buffers of pension funds against the 4%
actuarial discount rate, the problems could be even more pronounced if the
market value of liabilities is taken to calculate the funding ratio.
Having seen current funding ratios, we are interested in actual investment
policies over the past 5 years. Under loss aversion and rationality, we would
expect to see patterns of investment that show resemblance with some of
the V- or U-shaped patterns that were optimal for our loss averse model.
Figure 4.8 presents the scatter plots of the funding ratio versus fractional
stock investment for the six pension funds listed in Table 4.2. Table 4.3 lists
annual returns for representative stock and bond indices.
As can bee seen in Table 4.3, from 1997 to 2000 we have witnessed an
enormous surge in stock prices, followed by decline in 2000 and 2001. Bond
return have shown the exact opposite patterns, while one-year interest rates
have been fairly stable. For pension funds, the variability of liability growth
is very small compared to that of stock returns. Therefore, the movement
of the funding ratios in Figure 4.8 is for the most part determined by the
investment returns. For all funds we see the same relative movement of the
funding ratio: increasing from 1997 to 1999, decreasing from 1999 to 2001.
The only exceptions are PGGM and BPMT, who show a slight decrease of
the funding ratio over the years 1997-1998. Note that stock investments do
not have to be the only risky investments that pension funds have. Several
funds invest a significant part of their assets, i.e., more than 5%, in risky
investments such as private equity or real-estate. However, the fractions
invested in those categories were either too small or relatively stable over
time, so they are not considered in the analysis.
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Figure 4.8: Stock investment in relation to reported funding ratios
This figure shows funding ratios and fractions invested in stocks for six large Dutch pension
funds. Data is from annual reports of the respective funds, Vereniging van Bedrijfstakpen-
sioenfondsen(vvb). Where necessary, liabilities have been computed through (linear) ex-
trapolation.
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Ultimo 2001, the funds differ considerably in the fraction of stocks they
have. ABP and BPMT have around 40% stocks, with funding ratios of
1.1 and 1.2, respectively. Philips and SPF have 55%, with funding ratios
of 1.3 and 1.45. PGGM and Shell have a high 70% stock investment, and
funding ratios of 1.1 and 1.4. If we look at the three pairs of funds with
comparable stock investments, PGGM stands out, having one of the lowest
funding ratios, with the highest stock investment. It also has the most stable
fraction of stocks over time, so it might be the result of taking a long-term
calculated risk, rather than a double-or-nothing policy.
Turning to the investment patterns present in Figure 4.8, we see a diffuse
behavior for the first period 1997-1998. Stock returns were very high in
this year, but pension funds do not show a shared opinion on whether to
increase or decrease the fraction of stocks. In the top panels, ABP and Shell
had an increasing funding ratio, and decreasing stock fraction. The middle
two panels show funding ratios and stock fractions with only little variation.
The lower two panels show an increasing stock fraction with either a stable
or increasing funding ratio. Clearly, investment policies differed to a large
extent during the year 1997.
From 1998 onward, however, identical patterns emerge. At the end of
1999 the fraction of stocks has increased with the funding ratio, and has
decreased again at the end of 2000. From 2000 to 2001, the funding ratios
decrease further, but now the stock investments increase. The extent of the
stock increase in the last year is only small for ABP, PGGM, and SPF, but
given the large decreases in funding ratios (see the large negative returns
on stocks), it represents a significant investment decision for all funds. The
pattern can partly be explained by funds following a fixed-mix strategy. For
four of the six panels, namely ABP, PGGM, Philips and SPF, one could
imagine that the observed stock investments are the result of a fixed-mix
strategy, where rebalancing occurs at the beginning of each year. For SPF,
ABP, and Philips, though, we need to add the assumption that the strategic
asset mix has changed after 1997 or 1998. For two of the six funds, namely
Shell and BPMT, it is difficult to see how a fixed-mix policy would lead
to the observed patterns. Over the period 1998-2001, both funds show a
series of consecutive increasing and decreasing stock fractions of more than
7%-points.
At the end of Subsection 4.3.1, we have shown that buy-and-hold and
fixed-mix strategies have different risk-return properties, the attractiveness
of the strategies depending on whether the initial position has a positive or
negative surplus. This result might explain a pattern that is seen in form
example the panel for SPF. From 1997 to 2000, the points are more or less on
a straight line, implying a buy-and-hold policy. Such a policy was preferred
78
in a situation of positive surplus in our model. Then, from 2000 to 2001,
the asset mix remains fixed. This might be compared with the better risk-
return profile of the buy-and-hold policy when the initial situation is one of
underfunding.
Clearly, the preliminary analysis of Figure 4.8 can at best be only sug-
gestive about the validity of loss averse preferences for pension funds. The
main puzzle so far is to explain the increase or non-decrease in the fraction
of stocks in the portfolio from 2000 to 2001, despite two consecutive large
negative stock returns. So far, it appears that loss aversion might help in at
least explaining part of this puzzle.
4.6 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter has given an interpretation of the loss averse model introduced
in Chapter 2, where loss aversion was interpreted as an aversion to (actuarial)
funding ratios below 100%. The sensitivity of the optimal investment strat-
egy has been explored for changes in the economic assumptions on inflation,
the correlation between stock returns and inflation, and the level of the real
interest rate. Results for a different risk-measure, namely downside-devation
were also obtained, closely resembling those of the mean-shortfall model.
Section 4.5 considered patters of portfolio adjustment versus funding ra-
tios for six large Dutch pension funds. It did not give clear evidence that the
pattern of portfolio adjustment by pension funds is in accordance with the
optimal dynamic strategy under loss aversion. Further research using a larger
and richer dataset should be done to come up with better representations of
the investment strategies pension funds are following.
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5Household Savings under Loss
Aversion
5.1 Introduction
For at least half a decade, the life-cycle framework has been the standard
way for economists to model household behavior with respect to the allo-
cation of time, effort, and money. As explained in Browning and Crossley
(2001), the attractive properties of the life-cycle framework is that it prop-
agates the idea that agents make sequential decisions to achieve a coherent
goal using currently available information as best they can. A direct conse-
quence of this idea is that the economic behavior of households should be
aimed at keeping the marginal value of money constant over time, repre-
senting the optimum in a dynamic optimization. Within the framework of
the life-cycle hypothesis, the theory has led to a large theoretical and em-
pirical literature on consumption. However, in an overview of theories and
facts on household saving, Browning and Lusardi (1996) note that compared
with the large body of literature on consumption, there is a “relative igno-
rance that still surrounds the reasons why households save”. Especially the
existence and level of precautionary savings is not completely understood.
The precautionary savings motive represents the idea that some households
save more because they face more income uncertainty than others. Carroll
(1998) notes that the range of results that give a relation between savings
and uncertainty is disturbingly large. A major obstacle in estimating such
relationships is that theory provides no analytical result on how to specify
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uncertainty.
In this chapter we use the mean-shortfall objective from Chapter 2 to
represent household preferences with respect to consumption. That way,
consumption risk is represented as the explicit measure of expected shortfall
below a reference level. In analyzing the results we specifically look at the re-
lation between savings and wealth. As the model includes a benchmark level
of consumption, we come quite naturally to a notion of precautionary savings.
Precaution is seen as a motive to explain consumption patterns in empirical
studies, as in Caballero (1990), Normandin (1994), and Normandin (1997).
Another issue is the way in which uncertainty influences savings. Aizen-
man (1998) shows that disappointment aversion induces a positive relation
between uncertainty and the size of a buffer stock. Modeling a household
as a loss averse agent in Section 5.2, we derive the explicit decision rules
for consumption and savings behavior in Section 5.3. There, we also trace
the relation between uncertainty and savings. Section 5.4 introduces habit
formation and reveals how it affects the optimal consumption behavior. Sec-
tion 5.5 shows the optimal consumption rules when the value function from
Kahneman-Tversky is taken as a utility function. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 The model
We consider an agent with current wealth w who lives two periods and has
to decide on his current saving, which is denoted as the variable s. His first
and second period budget constraints are
c1 = w − s (5.1)
c2 = s · r, (5.2)
where c1, c2 denote consumption over period i, i = 1, 2, and r is the real
return on investment. We assume c1 > 0 and that the return r has an arbi-
trary absolute-continuous probability distribution function G(·) with support
(0,∞). It represents the gross return on investment, which can be produced
by a simple savings account, a portfolio of stocks, etc. Having an arbitrary
probability distribution G(·) contrasts with Aizenman (1998) and Bowman
et al. (1999), who also examine loss aversion but restrict uncertainty in in-
come to a binomial type of probability distribution. If in the following the
terms negative and positive return are used, they indicate that we are talking
about r in terms of the net return, i.e., r − 1, which can take on values in
(−1,∞).
We assume that the agent or household has a per-period loss averse utility
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function
u(ci, bi) = ci − λ · (bi − ci)
+, (5.3)
where λ > 0 is a loss aversion parameter, (y)+ is used to denote the maxi-
mum of 0 and y. The parameter bi is the benchmark level of consumption,
representing the level of consumption below which a loss is suffered, be it
physical, financial or mental. In Section 5.3 we assume bi is equal to the
fixed level b. Section 5.4 deals with the case of b2 being a function of b1 and
consumption in the first period, c1.
The utility function in (5.3) incorporates the main features of Kahneman
and Tversky’s value function, as it measures utility relative to a reference
point, and treats positive and negative deviations from the reference point
asymmetrically. The penalty parameter λ represents a measure for the costs
of not achieving a desired consumption level. The utility function in (5.3)
has been used before by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) in an attempt to explain
the equity premium puzzle. It is also the piecewise-linear equivalent of the
one used by Aizenman (1998), where λ is the disappointment aversion rate
and b the certainty equivalent consumption. Bowman et al. (1999) derive
axiomatic results for loss averse utility functions of which (5.3) is a special
case. Note that the two-period model can still be considered to be within the
standard life-cycle framework. Having two periods can be seen as modeling
life-time consumption in which smoothing happens at low frequencies, i.e.,
across two specific stages of the life-cycle. This observation puts the remark
by Browning and Crossley (2001) in context, who note that many psycholog-
ical or behavioral explanations rule out the life-cycle framework. Given the
behavioral roots of the utility function above, we must conclude that they
probably refer to work, e.g. Thaler (1994), in which no formal optimization
of consumption and savings is considered. Clearly, that is not the case here.
With (5.3) as the instantaneous utility function, the agent determines
savings through the following maximization problem
max
c1
c1 − λ · (b− c1)
+ + E(c2)− λ · E(b− c2)
+, (5.4)
subject to budget constraints (5.1) and (5.2). Note that we abstract from
time-discounting. In the above model, it would be appropriate to include a
parameter ρ for the last two terms, representing a discount with respect to
future consumption. However, this only increases the number of parameters
in the model, without changing the results. If appropriate, in the following
we will add a note to show how the results would change if time-discounting
was included.
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5.3 Results
The main results follow from the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.1 Under the condition
λ > max
(
0,
1− E[r]
E[r]
)
, (5.5)
the optimal solution 0 ≤ c∗1 ≤ w to (5.4) is given by
c∗1 =
{
min(b, w − b/r∗p) if E[r] ≥ 1,
max(b, w − b/r∗n) if E[r] < 1.
(5.6)
where r∗p, r
∗
n are the two rs that solve∫ r
0
rdG =
1− E[r]
λ
+ 1{E[r]>1}, (5.7)
and I{A} is the indicator function with respect to the event A. r
∗
p solves (5.7)
for a positive and r∗n for a negative (net) expected return.
The wealth levels at which consumption is equal to the benchmark are
given by w∗p and w
∗
n, corresponding to a positive and negative expected return
economy, respectively. They are defined as
w∗p = b · (1 + 1/r
∗
p), (5.8)
w∗n = b · (1 + 1/r
∗
n). (5.9)
Proof: See appendix.
Equation (5.6) in Theorem 5.3.1 gives parametric rules for the optimal
consumption strategy, which differs for positive and negative expected real
returns. For two different expected returns, Figure 5.1 graphically shows the
solutions to equation (5.7). Note that although a positive expected return
on investment is the most common assumption, one can easily imagine a
situation in which the expected positive (nominal) return on investments is
smaller than the combined effect of inflation and time-discounting. These
situations have occurred in economies with hyperinflation for example. Note
that a distinction in consumption/savings behavior based on the sign of the
expected return on savings has not been documented before in the literature.
To facilitate the interpretation of Theorem 5.3.1, we plot the optimal
consumption as a function of wealth in Figure 5.2, for a negative and a
positive expected return, respectively. The two levels w∗p and w
∗
n give the
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Figure 5.1: Solving equation (5.7)
In the figures, the line (1) represents the left-hand side of equation (5.7) as a
function of r. The line (2) represents the right-hand side of the equation. The
point of intersection gives the r that solves (5.7).
In the left panel, λ = 1, and r ∼ logN(0.085, 0.16), so that E[r] = 1.10 and the
line (2) lies at 0.9. The right panel has λ = 1, r ∼ logN(−0.04, 0.07), so that
E[r] = 0.96, and the line (2) lies at 0.04
point of the kink in the consumption rule for positive and negative expected
return, respectively.
In the case of a positive expected return, optimal consumption is the result
of a trade-off between first and (expected) second period utility. There is an
upper bound at level b, which is reached for wealth equal to or larger than
w∗p. Any additional wealth above w
∗
p is fully put into savings.
A negative expected return leads to having a lower bound on first period
consumption at level b. This level is reached for wealth below w∗p. Above
w∗n, optimal consumptions results from a trade-off between current and future
utility of consumption. Note that in the figure w∗p < w
∗
n. This need not be the
case in general, as w∗p and w
∗
n represent wealth levels in different economies.
Given Theorem 5.3.1, we can completely specify a parametric relation
for optimal savings. This contrasts with other studies like Bowman et al.
(1999), Aizenman (1998) and Carroll (1998), that have derived axiomatic or
numerical results for the consumption/savings decision of loss averse agents
under uncertainty. In our model the explicit savings rules are given by
s∗ =
{
min(w − b, b/r∗n) if E[r] ≥ 1,
max(w − b, b/r∗p) if E[r] < 1.
(5.10)
Expression (5.10) leads to a number of interesting results.
First, observe that the derivative of (5.10) with respect to wealth w is
either 0 or 1, implying that savings is nondecreasing in wealth. This can be
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Figure 5.2: Optimal period 1 consumption as a
function of initial wealth
For the positive expected return, r has a lognormal distribution
with µ = 0.085, and σ = 0.16. For the negative expected return,
G is lognormal with µ = −0.04, and σ = 0.07.Other parameter
values are λ = 1 and b = 60.
explained by the loss aversion with respect to period 2 consumption: even
if the return on savings is negative, the punishment on period 2 shortfall
outweighs the expected negative return on saving.
Second, (5.10) reveals the relation between the return distribution G(·)
and the amount of savings. The dependence on the return distribution only
enters through the values of rp and rn. Carroll (1998) shows that in other
theoretical models of consumption and savings behavior there can be multiple
measures of income uncertainty. This implies that for many of these models
it is not trivial to give the relation between savings and uncertainty. In
the model presented here, however, the per-period utility function in (5.3)
gives an explicit and unequivocal measure of the relevant uncertainty, namely
downside-risk. It is the lower expectation of r below the return level rp or
rn, depending on whether the expected savings return is positive or negative.
Moreover, from Theorem 5.3.1 it follows that for a given amount of savings,
the riskiness of the investment return influences saving unambiguously. To
see this, observe from equation (5.7) that if the expectation of r below r
increases, r itself should decrease to satisfy the equation. As r∗p and r
∗
n have
a nonnegative effect on optimal savings through equation (5.10) it follows
that an increase in the riskiness of period 2 wealth has a nondecreasing
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Figure 5.3: Optimal savings fraction
This figure shows the optimal fraction of wealth saved, s∗0, as a function of wealth at
time 0, w. For both graphs λ = 1, b = 60. In (a) r is distributed lognormal with
µ = 0.085, σ = 0.16, so E[r] > 1. In (b) G is also lognormal, µ = −0.04, σ = 0.07, so
E[r] < 1.
effect on savings. This means that precautionary saving, i.e. saving to build
up a buffer against future risk, is a motive for a loss averse agent in our
model, regardless of the expected return on saving. It corroborates the result
by Aizenman (1998), who finds that for disappointment averse (i.e. loss
averse) developing countries, buffer stocks are efficient, with size increasing
in the volatility of second period income. It also confirms a result by Bowman
et al. (1999) for the case of general loss averse utility functions. Restricting
income uncertainty to a binary symmetric distribution, they find that an
increase in uncertainty of income increases savings.
Finally, we derive the optimal fraction of wealth saved. This quantity
is relevant because most empirical studies on savings behavior consider this
measure as a dependent variable. Otherwise, savings behavior is not com-
parable between households with different wealth levels. Dividing left- and
right-hand sides of equation (5.10) by w, the fraction of wealth saved is clearly
restricted to the unit interval and given by
(s/w)∗ =
{
max{1− b/w, b
w·r∗p
} E[r] ≥ 1,
min{1− b/w, b
w·r∗n
} E[r] < 1.
(5.11)
Figure 5.3 shows a graph of the savings fraction as a function of initial
wealth.
Browning and Lusardi (1996) note on the motives for saving by house-
holds that “there is a widespread feeling that the wealthy have different mo-
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tives to save from the less wealthy.” This suggestion is explicitly confirmed
and illustrated through (5.11), as illustrated in Figure 5.3. In discussing the
difference in savings between the poor and the wealthy, we treat economies
with a positive and a negative real return separately.
To start with a positive return-economy, the kink in the savings-rule in
Figure 5.3(a) lies at w∗p. Define rich households to have wealth above w
∗
p
and poor household to have wealth below w∗p. Figure 5.3(a) then shows that
for poor households a higher initial wealth results in a smaller fraction of
wealth saved. For wealthy households the opposite effect holds: an increase
in wealth results in increased relative savings. From the list of motives given
by Browning and Lusardi (1996), the behavior of the poor households could
be well explained by the motive of precautionary savings. As wealth in-
creases, less money needs to be saved to reach the period 2 benchmark b. For
wealthy households, the savings pattern is explained by the intertemporal-
substitution motive. As wealth increases and expected return is positive,
more money is saved to enjoy a higher expected period 2 consumption.
For a negative return-economy Figure 5.3(b) shows a completely differ-
ent situation. The fraction of wealth saved is increasing in wealth for poor
households and decreasing in wealth for rich households. The contrast with
the positive expected return economy can be explained through the fact that
under a negative expected return, the marginal effect of increased savings on
period 2 utility is lower. Therefore, once wealth is so high that the interior
optimum exceeds the threshold, any extra wealth is consumed in period 1.
Hence the fraction saved decreases when wealth exceeds the (higher) thresh-
old.
Finally, we can take the freedom to view the comparative statics of Fig-
ure 5.3 as the decision rules for household saving with wealth as input, as
done in Bowman et al. (1999). In a setting with loss aversion, Bowman
et al. (1999) focus on the effects of shocks to income on consumption. They
find evidence that gains and losses in wealth have an asymmetric impact
on household consumption and saving behavior. In the current model we
have made this effect explicit in the optimal savings rules of Theorem 5.3.1,
illustrated in Figure 5.3. The fraction saved either increases or decreases in
wealth, depending on which side of the threshold the agent’s wealth is.
5.4 Habit formation
The benchmark level b in the formulation of the model in Section 5.2 is
fixed. However, the formulation of the objective function and state equation,
allow for a natural extension in which the benchmark in the second period
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is partly determined by consumption in the first period. Such a mecha-
nism is called habit formation. Habit formation is used in several context
in economics where consumption preferences are modeled. Constantinides
(1990) uses habit formation in an attempt to resolve the equity premium
puzzle. Recent papers by Seckin(2000a,b) explore the effect of habit for-
mation on precautionary savings in a classical model of consumption and
savings. Habit formation is also in the loss averse model of the previously
cited study of Bowman et al. (1999).
Duesenberry (1949) discusses habit formation, showing that it implies
that consumption decisions are not independent of each other. This is an-
other way of saying that with habit formation, the per-period utility function
is not time-separable, complicating the analysis of standard consumption
models, see the discussion in Browning and Lusardi (1996). In the current
section we show that including habit formation in the model of Section 5.2
retains tractability, while increasing insight in the effects of loss aversion on
consumption and savings.
Extending model 5.4 to include habit formation, we introduce two bench-
mark levels, b1 and b2, for period 1 and 2, respectively. Habit persistence is
then modeled by having b2 depend on period 1 consumption, using the same
specification as in Bowman et al. (1999):
b2 = (1− α) · b1 + α · c1, (5.12)
where α denotes the degree of habit persistence.1 α = 0 implies a fixed
benchmark for both periods, as in the previous sections. α = 1 implies that
the period 2 benchmark is equal to period 1 consumption.
Theorem 5.4.1 Consider the cases of a positive(I) and negative(II) expected
return separately.
I. If E[r] > 0, define
wp = b1 ·
(
1 + 1/r∗p
)
, (5.13)
where r∗p is the r that solves
λ− E[r]− λ
∫ r
0
(α + r)dG = 0. (5.14)
1Note that it is possible to use a separate α for upward and downward adjustments to
b2, say α
u and αd. This has a trivial effect on the optimal solution however, and does not
structurally change the results.
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The optimal consumption rule is given by
c∗1 =
{
w − αw+(1−α)b1
r∗p+α
if w ≤ wp,
b1 if w > wp.
(5.15)
II. If E[r] < 0, define
wL = b1 · (1 + 1/r
L
n), (5.16)
wH = b1 · (1 + 1/r
H
n ), (5.17)
where rLn is the r that solves
λ− E[r]− λ
∫ r
0
(α+ r)dG = 0, (5.18)
and rHn solves
−E[r]− λ
∫ r
0
(α + r)dG = 0. (5.19)
From equations (5.18) and (5.19) it follows that rLn > r
H
n , so wL < wH .
Optimal consumption is given by
c∗1 =


w − α·w+(1−α)b1
rLn+α
if w ≤ wL,
b1 if wL < w < wH ,
w − α·w+(1−α)b1
rHn +α
if w ≥ wH .
(5.20)
Proof: See appendix.
To analyze the consequences of Theorem 5.4.1, let us start with the case
of positive expected return, case I in the theorem. From equation (5.15), we
see that the optimal consumption decision looks similar to that of the model
without habit formation, see equation (5.6) in Theorem 5.3.1. The difference
lies in the influence of the degree of habit persistence α, that is influencing
the threshold wealth and the slope of the decision rule. To see the effect of
α, Figure 5.4 shows the optimal consumption as a function of initial wealth
for different values of α.
For α = 0, i.e., no habit persistence, the optimal consumption rule is
the same as in the previous section, compare Figure 5.2. Observe that wp
is the wealth level at the kink. When α increases, we see that the threshold
wealth wp increases and the slope of the optimal consumption rule decreases.
90
 40
 45
 50
 55
 60
 65
 90  95  100  105  110  115  120  125  130
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
Initial wealth
α=0.0
α=0.5
α=1.0
Figure 5.4: Consumption with habit formation
and positive expected return
For a positive expected return, λ = 1, b1 = 60, this figure shows
the optimal consumption as a function of initial wealth for varying
degrees of habit persistence. α = 0 corresponds to no habit per-
sistence, α = 1 implies b2 = c1. Parameter values are µ = 0.085,
σ = 0.16, λ = 1.
Both these observations follow more or less directly from Theorem 5.4.1.
From equation (5.14) it is clear that α has a decreasing effect on the upper
integral limit rp, which has itself a decreasing effect on wp. From the optimal
consumption rule in (5.15) we see that the effect of α on the slope of the
decision rule is given by −α/(r∗ + α), which is decreasing in α. Comparing
habit-formers(α = 1) to agents without habit formation(α = 0) shows that
for high wealth levels a lower consumption is accepted for the benefit of a
lower second period reference point. For low wealth, consumption may be
higher, as the second period reference point will be lower anyhow.
For the case of a negative expected return, the optimal consumption rule
is visualized in Figure 5.5.
Let us first concentrate on the left side of Figure 5.5. When there is
habit persistence(α > 0), we see that below the threshold wL, first period
consumption is not kept at the benchmark level. Again, it is the combination
of increased savings and a lower period 2 benchmark level, that makes this
an optimal strategy. We see that for α = 0, the increase of savings alone does
not justify a consumption below the benchmark, as the return on savings is
negative. The change in slope of the consumption decision shows the same
91
 52
 54
 56
 58
 60
 62
 64
 66
 68
 70
 110  115  120  125  130  135  140
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
Initial wealth
α=0.0
α=0.5
α=1.0
Figure 5.5: Consumption with habit formation
and negative expected return
For a negative expected return, λ = 1, b1 = 60, this figure shows
the optimal consumption as a function of initial wealth for varying
degrees of habit persistence. α = 0 corresponds to no habit per-
sistence, α = 1 implies b2 = c1. Parameter values are µ = −0.04,
σ = 0.07, λ = 1.
behavior as for the positive return case.
For larger wealth levels, Figure 5.5 shows that habit persistence leads to
a decrease in consumption relative to the case α = 0. That is because an
increase in consumption does not only decrease period 2 expected consump-
tion, but also increases the period 2 benchmark and thus decreases utility
further.
5.5 Kahneman & Tversky preferences
The Kahneman-Tversky value function as estimated in Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992) is given by
v(c) =
{
x0.89 if x ≥ 0,
−2.25 · (−x)0.89 if x < 0,
(5.21)
where the variable x represents the deviation from the reference point. See
also Chapter 3. In the context of consumption and savings, we simply take
x = c − b and solve the optimization problem with (5.21) as instantaneous
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Figure 5.6: Optimal solution for the Kahneman-Tversky
objective function
The left panel shows the results for a positive expected return, r ∼
logN(0.085, 0.16), the right panel for a negative expected return r ∼
logN(−0.04, 0.16). α = 0 corresponds to no habit persistence, α = 1 to full
habit persistence. Parameter values are b1 = 60.
utility function. The results are in Figure 5.6 for both positive and negative
expected return.
Comparing Figure 5.6 with Figures 5.4 and 5.5, we see a large degree
of similarity. There are two differences, however. First, for α = 0 in the
positive-return case, for Kahneman-Tversky utility the first-period consump-
tion increases beyond the benchmark, while for bilinear utility the benchmark
is never exceeded. This is a consequence of the convexity of the behavioral
value function in the domain of losses. The convexity is not large enough
to increase consumption significantly above the benchmark when there is
habit persistence though. A second difference is in the shape of the lines
in Figure 5.6. They resemble the shape of the value function itself: a small
area below the reference point has a very high slope, the marginal utility of
consumption goes to infinity when consumption approaches the benchmark
level. In the figure, we can observe that when consumption is close to the
benchmark level of 60, the optimal decision becomes extremely sensitive to
the initial wealth level. This is very different from the bilinear objective,
where consumption was a bilinear function of wealth.
For the negative expected return-case, the consumption patterns for Kah-
neman - Tversky utility stay roughly the same. A difference with Figure 5.5
emerges for habit persistence in that consumption above the benchmark does
not take off, while for the bilinear objective, consumption rises linearly with
wealth. The difference is caused by the concavity in gains for the Kahneman-
Tversky objective: the marginal value of first period consumption above the
benchmark is decreasing in the level. Together with an increased second-
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period reference point and high marginal utility around the reference point,
increasing first period consumption is not attractive in the case of Kahneman-
Tversky utility.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have incorporated a bilinear objective function from Chap-
ter 2 into a standard consumption-savings framework. The formulation
makes it possible to derive explicit decision rules for optimal saving. From
these rules we concluded that the amount of saving is nondecreasing in wealth
and in risk, the latter being a shortfall measure on the left tail of the return
distribution. Furthermore, a remarkable result is that policies in terms of the
fraction saved differ remarkable between high-wealth and low-wealth house-
holds and for different types of economies, i.e., expected returns.
The inclusion of habit formation showed that it can drastically change
consumption and savings behavior. For positive as well as negative expected
return, it increases the wealth level at which the first-period benchmark is
consumed. Consumption below the benchmark decreases first-period utility,
but increases second-period utility through the combined effect of increased
savings and a lower reference point. The figures of optimal consumption have
shown that the average slope of the consumption function as a function of
wealth becomes smaller, i.e., consumption changes take place more gradually.
Finally, in accordance with the results of Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, we
find that the results found do not change significantly when the Kahneman-
Tversky value function is taken as instantaneous utility function. This im-
plies that the results for the model analyzed in this chapter can be relevant
for empirical work on consumption, investment, and savings.
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Appendix
5.A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 5.3.1:
We start with a reformulation of the optimization problem in (5.4):
max
c1
c1 − λ · (b− c1)
+ + E[s · r]− λ · E[b− s · r]+, (5A.1)
s.t. s = w − c1. (5A.2)
Denote the value of the objective function (5A.1) for a fixed value of c1
by v(c1). The first order condition for an interior optimum is given by
E
[
∂v
∂c1
]
= 0, (5A.3)
where
E
[
∂v
∂c1
]
=
{
1 + λ− E[r]− λ ·
∫ r
0
rdG if c1 ≤ b,
1− E[r]− λ ·
∫ r
0
rdG if c1 > b,
(5A.4)
and r is defined as
r =
b
w − c1
. (5A.5)
r is the threshold return that gives b− s · r = 0.
The second order condition to problem (5A.1) is given by
E
[
∂2v
∂c21
]
= −λ ·
b2
(w − c1)3
· g(r) < 0, (5A.6)
where g(·) is the density function of the return r. g(·) is nonnegative by
definition, so the second order condition ensures that any c1 < w that satis-
fies (5A.4) is optimal.
As G(·) has support on (0,∞), the derivative for c1 ≤ b as given in (5A.4)
is strictly decreasing in r. For E[r] ≥ 1 it follows from (5A.4) that c∗1 ≤ b, as
for c1 > b the derivative with respect to c1 is negative for all r. Hence, the
appropriate derivative in the case E[r] ≥ 1 is the first line in (5A.4). This
includes the case E[r] > 1 + λ when c∗1 = 0.
If E[r] < 1, it follows from (5A.4) that c∗1 > b, as for c1 ≤ b the derivative
with respect to c1 is strictly positive for all r . Hence, the appropriate
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derivative is the second line in equation (5A.4). The derivative is zero for a
r <∞, if λ > (1− E[r])/E[r]), which is ensured by condition (5.5).
The solution is now determined by the r∗p and r
∗
n that follow from putting
the appropriate derivative in (5A.4) to zero and solving for r . As there is
no other term including c1 in (5A.4), the optimal c
∗
1 follows directly from the
calculated bounds on c∗1 and the definition of r . It is given by
c∗1 =
{
min(b, w − b/r∗p) if E[r] ≥ 1,
max(b, w − b/r∗n) if E[r] < 1.
(5A.7)
The levels w∗p and w
∗
n follow from putting c
∗
1 = b and solving for w.
Proof of Theorem 5.4.1:
The proof starts along the same lines of the proof of Theorem 5.3.1. The
optimization with habit formation is given as
max
c1
c1 − λ · (b1 − c1)
+ + E[s · r]− λ · E[b2 − s · r]
+, (5A.8)
s.t. s = w − c1, (5A.9)
and b2 = (1− α) · b1 + α · c1. (5A.10)
Denote the value of the objective function (5A.8) for a fixed value of c1
by v(c1). The first order condition for an interior optimum is given by
E
[
∂v
∂c1
]
= 0, (5A.11)
where
E
[
∂v
∂c1
]
=
{
1 + λ− E[r]− λ ·
∫ r
0
(α + r)dG if c1 ≤ b,
1− E[r]− λ ·
∫ r
0
(α + r)dG if c1 > b,
(5A.12)
and r is defined as
r =
(1− α) · b1 + αc1
w − c1
− 1. (5A.13)
The second order condition to problem (5A.8) is given by
E
[
∂2v
∂c21
]
= −λ
(w − c1) · α + (1− α) · b1 + α · c1
(w − c1)2
· (α+ r) · g(r), (5A.14)
where g(·) > 0 is the density function of the return r. For any c1 < w,
expression (5A.14) is negative, ensuring that any c1 < w that satisfies (5A.12)
is an interior optimal solution.
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For E[r] ≥ 1 it follows from (5A.12) that c∗1 ≤ b1, as for c1 > b1 the
derivative with respect to c1 is negative for all r. Hence, the appropriate
derivative when there is an interior solution is the first line in (5A.12). If
there is no interior solution, either c∗1 = 0 or c
∗
1 = b1. If for a given α, r
α
solves (5A.12), then the wealth level wpα at which c
∗
1 = b1 can be derived from
the definition of r in (5A.13). It is given by
wpα = b1 · (1 + 1/r
α), (5A.15)
which is decreasing in rα. As α > 0, it follows from (5A.12) that rα is de-
creasing in α, so wpα is increasing in α. This completes the proof of part I.
Unlike the case without habit formation, if E[r] < 1 the derivative for
c1 < b1 is not positive for all r. This can only be true for all α when we would
demand (λ + 1)(E[r]) < 1, which is the exact opposite of the (reasonable)
assumption we made in Theorem 5.3.1. We have to conclude that both lines
in (5A.12) can constitute a local optimum, which need to be analyzed both.
Having the two areas for a possible optimum, we analyze the wealth levels
for both areas at which c1 is exactly equal to b1. Define
wL = b1 · (1 + 1/r
L
n), (5A.16)
wH = b1 · (1 + 1/r
H
n ), (5A.17)
where rLn and r
H
n are the r that solve (5A.12) for consumption lower and
higher than the benchmark b, respectively. It follows directly from the first
order conditions that rLn > r
H
n , so wH > wL. The latter implies that for
wealth below wL, the optimal consumption follows from the definition of r
and the value of r∗ that solves (5A.12) for c1 ≤ b1. For wealth above wH , the
r∗ for c1 > b1 is the relevant one. If wealth lies between the two thresholds,
optimal consumption is equal to b1.
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6Explaining Hedge Fund Returns by
Loss Aversion
6.1 Introduction
There is a growing interest in hedge fund performance among investors, aca-
demics, and regulators alike. Investors and academics are intrigued by the
unconventional performance characteristics of these funds. Regulators on the
other hand are concerned with the market impact of hedge funds’ reported
speculative activities during major market events.
Most hedge funds not being formally regulated, are not limited in the type
of assets they can hold. Moreover, they face less restrictions on short sales
than standard mutual funds and can be highly leveraged and concentrated in
specific sectors, countries and/or asset categories. The fund’s management
compensation is based on the fund’s financial performance, something that is
less common for conventional mutual funds. According to Edwards (1999),
mutual fund managers are generally compensated a flat-fee structure of assets
under management. A typical hedge fund, by contrast, charges a 1% fixed
fee and 20% of profits.
Given the dramatic increase in the number of hedge funds over the past
decade and their large degree of freedom in investment behavior, there has
been much recent attention devoted to measuring the performance and re-
turn characteristics of hedge funds, see for example Amin and Kat (2001),
Fung and Hsieh (1997), Fung and Hsieh (2001), Agarwal and Naik (2000b),
and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). Popular opinion has it that hedge funds,
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through their large freedom and degree of specialization, deliver exceptionally
high returns and are market-neutral. That is, it is believed that hedge fund
returns are not correlated with (stock)market returns. If this is true, this
is an attractive feature for many institutional investors. The papers cited
above concentrate on hedge funds’ investment strategies, explaining hedge
fund returns empirically. They focus on market efficiency and value-added
created by hedge funds and their managers. They find that hedge funds do
not outperform stock market returns in terms of average return and volatil-
ity. However, the standard method of measuring performance does not work
for hedge funds.
A simple approach to performance measurement that works well for stan-
dard mutual funds is the asset class factor model of Sharpe (1992). Sharpe
models the return Ri on a fund i as
Ri = wi1F1 + wi2F2 + . . .+ winFn + ei, (6.1)
where Ri is the vector of returns on fund i, Fj is the value of systematic
factor j, and ei presents the non-systematic factors in the return for fund i.
The wijs represent the sensitivities of the returns Ri to factor Fj. Sharpe
selects 12 major asset classes for the factors F1, . . . , F12 and finds a correlation
coefficient of about 90% for a sample of US mutual funds. This implies that
the return of mutual funds can be well approximated by a linear combination
of returns on standard asset classes. This systematic part of the return is
referred to as ‘style’ by Sharpe. The other part, the return variation that
cannot be explained, is called ‘selection’. The excess return ei should be
attributed to the skills of management in selecting the individual securities,
hence the name ‘selection’. The basic result of Sharpe that standard asset
classes can explain most of the variation in mutual funds’ returns have been
confirmed and extended by various other authors, for example Brown and
Goetzmann (1997) and De Roon et al. (2000).
In contrast to the style regressions of type (6.1) for mutual funds, Fung
and Hsieh (1997) find that for hedge funds the straightforward approach of
Sharpe does not provide a good fit. These results are confirmed by Agarwal
and Naik (2000a), who find low correlations with different indices. Also,
Brealey and Kaplanis (2001) find evidence for changing factor loadings over
time. Fung and Hsieh argue that the lack of fit of (6.1) for hedge funds is due
to the extensive use of dynamic trading strategies. Mutual funds generally
follow a relatively stable investment strategy, resulting in wij’s between zero
and one with modest time variation. By contrast, according to Fung and
Hsieh hedge funds have weights wij between -10 and 10. In addition, the
managers’ opportunism may cause the wij’s to change quickly over time and
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Figure 6.1: Empirical nonlinear relations between systematic hedge
fund return factors and standard asset class returns.
The figures are based on data in Fung and Hsieh (1997), Table 1. We use their systematic
risk factors for hedge fund returns corresponding to a specific qualitative descriptor. Given
a factor return Ft and a traditional asset class return Rt, the pairs (Ft, Rt) are sorted on
Rt and grouped into quintiles. For each quintile, the average return on Ft and Rt is plotted
in the graphs.
across market conditions. This helps to explain why traditional Sharpe style
regressions (6.1) fail dramatically for hedge funds.
The inappropriateness of Sharpe’s model for hedge funds, leads Fung
and Hsieh (1997) to consider dynamic strategies. As there is an infinite
number of possible dynamic trading strategies, factor analysis is used to
determine the dominant styles in hedge funds. They find that adding the style
factors to Sharpe’s model explains a significantly larger part of the return
variation. Moreover, they identify distinctly nonlinear relations between their
new factors and traditional asset class returns as used in a typical Sharpe
style regression. Figure 6.1 presents four of the most prevalent examples of
nonlinear relations as found by Fung and Hsieh.
The hedge fund industry already has its qualitative descriptors for certain
types of hedge funds. These can be used to qualify the style factors. Com-
parable sets of qualifiers are used throughout the hedge fund literature, see
for example Osterberg and Thomson (1999), Edwards and Caglayan (2001)
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and Brown and Goetzmann (1997). In Figure 6.1 the qualifier for each style
factor is from Fung and Hsieh and comes from the fund that has the high-
est correlation with that style factor. “Systems/Trend Following” refers to
traders who use technical trading rules and are mostly trend followers. “Sys-
tems/Opportunistic” refers to technically driven traders who also take occa-
sional bets on market events relying on rule-based models. “Global/Macro”
refers to managers who primarily trade in the most liquid markets in the
world, such as currencies and government bonds, typically taking bets on
macroeconomic events such as changes in interest rate policies and currency
devaluations. These strategies rely mostly on their assessments of economic
fundamentals.
Fung and Hsieh (1997) argue that Figure 6.1 shows option-like pay-off
patterns in hedge fund returns. For example, the upper-left panel may be
identified as a long straddle, whereas the upper-right and lower-left panels
roughly correspond to long call and short put positions, respectively. Fung
and Hsieh (2001) then proceed by including returns on buy and hold strate-
gies of lookback-straddles. A similar approach is followed by Agarwal and
Naik (2000b), who further show that the descriptive model also has significant
out-of-sample forecasting power. Both these papers increase our understand-
ing of the kind of strategies that hedge funds are likely to follow. There is an
important question, however, that current research has not yet addressed. If
hedge fund returns are so highly nonlinear and strategies are very different
from standard buy-and-hold or constant-fraction portfolio strategies as de-
rived in for example Merton (1990), what preferences drive the investment
managers of these funds? Even deeper, why are these funds there at all?
Some may argue that the observed patterns of hedge fund returns are
merely a statistical artifact and that neither investors in hedge funds, nor
hedge fund managers themselves, really know what type of pay-off pattern
they generate. These arguments may be supported by the renowned secrecy
surrounding hedge fund strategies and investment policies. In this chapter we
refrain from yielding directly to the argument of irrational investors. Instead,
we offer a framework of rational, loss averse investors that optimally choose
payoff patterns that are remarkably similar to those presented in Figure 6.1.
Loss aversion originates from the area of behavioral finance. As a perspec-
tive for explaining observed financial markets’ or institutions’ behavior it is
rapidly finding its way into the finance literature. Originating with the work
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we have seen its application to studying
the equity premium puzzle, see Benartzi and Thaler (1995); rationalizing the
momentum effect, see Shefrin and Statman (1985); explaining the behavior
of asset prices in equilibrium, in particular boom and bust patterns, see Bar-
beris et al. (2001) and Berkelaar and Kouwenberg (2000a); and explaining
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individual stock returns, see Barberis and Huang (2001). Building on the
same framework and model specification for loss aversion as these earlier
papers, we provide a rational explanation for observed hedge fund payoff
patterns.
Besides evidence from behavioral finance there is another ex ante rea-
son to suspect that loss aversion is an important phenomenon for hedge
funds. This is the existence and structure of incentive fees. According to Ed-
wards (1999), hedge funds pay managers large incentive fees as a fraction
of the return achieved. Brown et al. (1999) mention common fees of 1%
of funds under management and 20% of the profits, the same numbers as
found by Liang (1999) in a large sample of hedge funds. Together with high
incentive fees, however, investors usually require hedge fund managers to put
a substantial amount of their own wealth in the fund. This requirement is
obviously rooted in the preference of investors, who do not wish management
to adopt a “recklessly risky” strategy. In conjunction with the use of high-
water marks, managers can suffer a substantial personal loss if returns end
up below a certain threshold level. As noted in Carpenter (2000), the most
typical benchmark for hedge fund managers is a constant like the discounted
value of current funds under management, or a benchmark representing a
safe return, like a Treasury yield. We interpret the incentive scheme that is
described above as (i) stimulating the manager to maximize expected fund
wealth (or return) on the one hand, and (ii) making him loss averse to avoid
moral hazard problems, i.e. excessive risk taking. The contribution of this
chapter is that we combine these two effects into a model where the trade-
off is between maximizing wealth and minimizing expected shortfall below a
fixed target level. The present chapter can also be read as a generalization of
a static version of the model in Chapter 2, as we include linear and non-linear
investment products in the asset allocation decision.
The next section presents the model in its relation to other theoretical
work in this area. From this model, we derive that the typical graphs of
Figure 6.1 are exactly the four patterns that are optimal for a rational investor
with mean-shortfall preferences. In Section 3 we highlight the model’s main
implications. Section 4 concludes.
6.2 Model
In this section we introduce a simple model in which the hedge fund invest-
ment decision is represented through an investor with a loss averse objective
function. We consider an investor with initial wealth W0 who optimizes
expected utility defined over terminal wealth level W1. We choose wealth
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instead of return for ease of exposition. It is clear that there is an equivalent
formulation in terms of possible return. The objective function we propose
to model investor preferences is the mean-shortfall objective from Chapter 2,
given by
max E[W1]− λ · E[(W
B −W1)
+], (6.2)
λ is the loss aversion parameter. The investor thus faces a trade-off between
expected wealth on the one hand, and expected shortfall below the bench-
mark wealth level WB on the other hand. If WB = W0, the investor weighs
losses differently from gains. Instead of imposing a constraint on down-
side risk in the optimization problem, as in Basak and Shapiro (2001), we
have incorporated the constraint in the objective function. This allows us to
describe additional empirical features in hedge fund returns to the methodol-
ogy followed by Basak and Shapiro. Barberis et al. (2001) use the expected
shortfall measure in (6.2) as a risk measure to shed light on the behavior of
firm-level stock returns in an asset-pricing framework. In their set up, W B
represents the historical benchmark wealth level, which may represent an av-
erage of recent portfolio wealth or the wealth at the end of a year. Berkelaar
and Kouwenberg (2000b) use the more general specification of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) to solve a similar problem in continuous time.
Note that (6.2) is also relevant empirically. Sharpe (1998) explains how (6.2)
is used by Morningstar to construct its ‘risk-adjusted rating’ for mutual
funds. As these ratings in turn profoundly influence the flow of money to
a mutual fund, see Guercio and Tkac (2001), (6.2) de facto reflects actual
preferences of at least part of the investment industry. Benartzi and Thaler
(1995) also use (6.2) as an approximation to the behavioral value function to
explain the equity premium puzzle.
To model the investment opportunities available to a hedge fund, we
assume that the investor can select 3 assets, namely a risk-free asset, a linear
risky asset, and an option on the risky asset. We label the risky asset as stock
in the rest of this chapter and normalize its initial price to 1. It should be
kept in mind, however, that our results are not limited to stock investments.
Alternative interpretations of the risky asset comprise stock indices, bonds
or interest rates, and currencies. The stock has an uncertain pay-off u with
distribution function G(u). We assume that G(·) is defined on (0,∞), is
twice continuously differentiable and satisfies E[u − rf ] > 0, i.e., there is a
positive equity premium. The option is modeled as a European call option
on the stock with strike price x. Its current price is denoted by c. To avoid
making a particular choice for the option’s pricing model, we set the planning
period equal to the option’s time to maturity. The option’s pay-off, Rc, is
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now completely determined by the stock return as (u−x)+. We assume there
is a positive risk premium for the option as well, i.e., E[(u − x)+/c] > rf .
Concentrating on hedge funds, we do not introduce any constraints on the
positions the investor can take in any of these assets. We obtain
W1 = W0rf +X0 · (u− rf ) +X1 · (Rc − c · rf), (6.3)
where rf is the pay-off on the risk-free asset, X0 is the number of shares,
and X1 the number of call options. The investor now maximizes (6.2) over
{X0, X1}. Note that the evolution of wealth as described here compares
with equation (2.1) of the model in Chapter 2. The only difference is the
possibility of investing in a call option on the risky asset, and the fact that
the present model is only a single-period model.
For ease of exposition we focus on the one-period model. The optimization
problem introduced above is static. This may seem inappropriate for hedge
funds, which are known to follow highly dynamic investment strategies. As
argued in the introduction, however, there is ample empirical evidence that
static models with non-linear instruments like options can explain a large part
of the variation in hedge fund returns, both in-sample and out-of-sample, see
Fung and Hsieh (1997) and Agarwal and Naik (2000b). Also, Chapter 2 of
this thesis shows that the solution to the multi-period version of (6.2) gives
decision rules at each period that have the same shape as the solution to the
one-period model. However, another objection to the present set-up might
be that we only include a single option. The main advantage of focusing
on one option only, is that we are able to highlight the main features of
the present model without introducing unnecessary complications. Even in
this simple set-up, the model can describe several different pay-off patterns
observed empirically. Moreover, Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) find that
including more than one option in their contingent claims analysis does not
give a better fit to their dataset of mutual fund returns. Similar results have
been established by Agarwal and Naik (2000b), who show that for most hedge
fund returns adding one option related factor in the Sharpe style regressions
suffices to capture most of the non-linearity.
The following theorem gives our main result.
Theorem 6.2.1 The optimal investment strategy for a finite solution to
problem (6.2) is given by one of the following:
I: X∗0 = 0, and X
∗
1 = S0/c, (6.4)
II: X∗0 = −S0/p, and X
∗
1 = −X
∗
0 , (6.5)
III:
(
X0 +X1
−X0
)
= 1
A
·
(
x− u¯1
u¯2 − x
)
· S0 · rf , (6.6)
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where u¯1 < x < u¯2, and A > 0. S0 represents time 0 surplus, defined as
W0 − W
B/rf . Through put-call parity, p is the price of a put option with
strike price x as p = x/rf + c− 1.
Proof: See appendix.
Theorem 6.2.1 states that if (6.2) has a finite solution, then the optimal
investment strategy takes one out of three possible forms. A finite solution is
ensured by a sufficiently high loss aversion parameter λ in (6.2). Unbounded
solutions are less interesting in this setting, as they are not observed in
practice.
Strategy I corresponds to a long position in the risk-free asset and the call
option. The amount invested in the call option is exactly equal to the time
0 surplus. Strategy II corresponds to a short put position: an amount equal
to the net shortfall is earned by selling puts. Strategy III is a condensed
representation of either a long or short straddle1 position. As A, x − u¯1,
and u¯2 − x are all assumed positive under III, the sign of X0 +X1 and −X0
are completely determined by the sign of the surplus S0. If the surplus is
positive, we obtain a long straddle position. There is a short position in
stocks, −X0 > 0, which is offset by the long call position for sufficiently high
stock prices, X0 +X1 > 0. Similarly, if the surplus is negative, we obtain a
short straddle pay-off pattern. The appendix shows how u¯1 and u¯2 are derived
from the model parameters and defines A as a function of u¯1, u¯2, and rf only.
Theorem 6.2.1 shows that the optimal pay-offs from model (6.2) are ex-
actly those found by Fung and Hsieh (1997) in Figure 6.1. To make this
point even stronger, we conduct a simple numerical experiment. Using a
lognormal G(·), we compute the optimal solution to (6.2) for different strike
prices and surplus levels. Computing the optimum is straightforward. It
can either be done by discretizing G(·), or by solving the first order condi-
tions. The latter are derived in the appendix in order to prove Theorem 6.2.1
and are very easy to solve numerically for any G(·). Figure 6.2 presents the
results. For a positive surplus, we obtain a long straddle or a long call strat-
egy, depending on whether the strike price is low or high, respectively. For
negative surplus levels, the short put and short straddle are optimal for low
and high strike prices, respectively. The similarity between Figure 6.2 and
Figure 6.1 is striking: the present simple set-up provides a unified framework
that can explain a large portion of all the different pay-off patterns observed
empirically. Strike prices and surplus levels determine which of the pay-offs
1We use the term straddle to denote a portfolio of long put and call positions, where
the number of puts and calls are not necessarily equal.
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Figure 6.2: Characteristics of the optimal pay-offs as a function of
the strike price x and the surplus W0 −W
B/rf .
The figure displays optimal pay-offs as a function of the risky return u for four different
combinations of initial surplus S0 and strike price of the option. Though the precise
form and steepness of these four pay-offs may vary if other combinations of S0 and strike
are used, they are representative (in terms of positive/negative slope to the left/right of
the strike) for the area in which they are plotted. These areas are bounded by the bold
lines in the figure. The horizontal line separates positive from negative surplus. The two
vertical lines separate ‘high’ from ‘low’ strike prices (for positive and negative surplus,
respectively). The upper left panel has a strike of 0.85, the upper right and lower left
panel of 0.95, the right panel of 1.15. The stock return is distributed lognormal(0.085,
0.16), the call is priced using Black-Scholes.
is optimal in a particular setting.
It can be seen from Theorem 6.2.1 that higher absolute surplus levels |S0|
lead to more ‘aggressive’ investment policies, i.e., larger investments in the
risky asset. For example, for increasingly large and positive values of the
surplus, the number of long straddles or long puts increases as well, resulting
in a steeper pay-off over the non-flat segments of the pay-off pattern. A
similar result holds if the surplus becomes increasingly negative.
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6.3 Implications for hedge funds
In Section 6.2 we found the optimal investment policies for a loss averse
investor in a static setting. As mentioned, these results can be linked to pay-
off patterns generated by dynamic investment strategies following the ideas
of Fung and Hsieh (1997). Their paper, however, is mainly empirical. In this
section we provide additional arguments linking the results of Theorem 6.2.1
and Figure 6.2 to dynamic investment strategies that are actually used by
hedge funds.
The first dynamic strategy is that of a market timer as described by
Merton (1981). Merton shows that the return pattern of such a strategy
resembles a straddle on the traded asset. This idea is pursued further by
Fung and Hsieh (2001), who find that using the return to a synthetic lookback
straddle captures most of the variation in returns of Trend Following hedge
funds. The upper-left panel in Figure 6.2 therefore clearly corresponds to at
least one dynamic investment strategy.
Another popular dynamic investment strategy is portfolio insurance, see
for example Leland (1980). The basic idea is to reduce to proportion of
stock if prices fall, and to increase it if prices rise. This mimics a delta
hedge strategy of a call option, which is precisely the pay-off pattern given
in the upper-right panel of Figure 6.2. Portfolio insurance strategies are es-
pecially attractive for financial institutions facing short-term restrictions on
their asset value, like certain pension funds, as argued by Shefrin and Stat-
man (1985), Benninga and Blume (1985), Brennan and Solanki (1981).
Convergence bets as a dynamic investment strategy typically generate a
pay-off pattern resembling a short put position, see the lower-left panel in
Figure 6.2. A good example of this type of strategy is merger arbitrage as
documented by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). By taking a long position in
the stock of the target in a merger or takeover, and a corresponding short
position in the stock of the acquirer in case payment is in stock rather than
cash, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) show that positive returns are possible in
bull markets. These return are largely uncorrelated with the market, i.e.,
they have a beta equal to zero. In bear markets, mergers are more likely
to fail, such that the merger arbitrage strategy results in potentially large
losses there. These losses usually correlate positively with the market. The
correlation pattern documented by Mitchell and Pulvino is precisely that of
a short put. It is not surprising, therefore, that including a put-option re-
turn in the Sharpe style regressions for merger arbitrage returns significantly
increases the explanatory power. Mitchell and Pulvino also show that hedge
funds specialized in merger arbitrage generate pay-offs very similar to short
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puts, albeit that they have a slightly positive beta in bull markets. Differ-
ent interpretations of the short put pattern are also possible, for example,
convergence bets in credit markets. In that case, the short put may be seen
as a direct reflection of the credit spread, see Merton (1974). By taking
off-setting positions in corporate and government bonds, or in bonds of gov-
ernments with different credit ratings, one can lock in the spread in most
cases. In case of default (of the long position), however, the strategy results
in a large loss. Strategies of this type are known to have been implemented
by, for example, LTCM. Jorion (2000) notes on the strategies followed by
LTCM, that “Another view is that these strategies are actually designed to
take a big loss once in a while ,like a short position in an option.”
The short straddle position in the lower-right panel is more difficult to
link up with well-known dynamic investment strategies, and we will conjec-
ture on some of the possible explanations for this further below. Thus far,
we have established a link between the optimal pay-off patterns emerging
from our model and the pay-offs on dynamic investment strategies that are
documented, either empirically or theoretically. In the remainder of this sec-
tion, we further explore the validity and implications of our model for hedge
funds.
It is clear from Figure 6.2 that the shape of the optimal pay-off crucially
depends on two variables, namely the (sign of the) surplus and the location
of the strike price. We start with discussing the former. Figure 6.2 clearly
shows that there is a remarkable difference between strategies for a positive
and negative surplus, respectively. The interpretation of the surplus in the
context of hedge funds is not straightforward and crucially depends on the
interpretation of the benchmark WB. As discussed in the introduction and
documented in Brown et al. (1999) and Brown et al. (1997), most hedge
fund managers get their bonuses if the fund earns a return above high-water
marks. The mark can be given by a treasury bill return, a fixed return, or a
return based on average market performance. If, for example, the high-water
mark is fixed or is linked to a treasury yield, a sufficiently high intermediate
return over part of the measurement period brings the fund into a situation
with a positive ‘surplus’. So with respect to the managers of the fund, we
can interpret the surplus in terms of the return that is necessary to attain
the high-water mark. Analogously, a negative intermediate return may jeop-
ardize the manager’s future fee and bring him in a situation of a negative
surplus. Alternatively, Barberis et al. (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2001)
use the idea of a surplus together with mental accounting practices adopted
by loss averse investors. In their set-up, surplus represents the difference
between the current price of a stock or fund and its historical benchmark.
The historical benchmark may represent an average of recent stock prices,
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or some specific historical stock price, such as the price at the end of the
year. The difference between the realized stock price and the benchmark,
if positive, is the investor’s personal measure of how much ‘he is up’ on his
investment and conversely, if negative, how much ‘he is down’. If this way
of mental accounting is relevant for modeling investor preferences, then our
results suggest that the behavior of hedge funds is in line with the preferences
of those who invest in it. This fits in with the incentive schemes as discussed
before, such that these schemes can be seen as the proper instrument for
attaining alignment.
One of the results also mentioned in the previous section was that larger
absolute values of the surplus |S0| result in steeper pay-off patterns. In
particular, if the surplus becomes increasingly negative, our model predicts
that a more aggressive investment strategy is adopted. Intuition for this can
be found in Brown et al. (1997). They discuss the consequences of high-
water mark thresholds used by hedge fund managers and note: ‘If a fund has
a negative return, the manager is out of the money and presumably has an
incentive to increase risk’. Theorem 6.2.1 formalizes this intuition.
Given the above interpretation of surplus, our model predicts that funds
with high water marks are more likely to follow convergence strategies. Vice
versa, if our proposed rational framework has empirical content, we would
expect higher high-water marks for firms focusing on convergence bets. Some
anecdotal empirical evidence supporting our claim is available for LTCM.
Jorion (2000) explains that the core strategy of LTCM was a relative-value
or convergence-arbitrage trade on credit spreads, while Edwards (1999) states
that LTCM had one of the highest incentive fees in the industry.
The second important variable driving influencing the shape of the op-
timal pay-off pattern is the strike price x of the option. The strike price
links to the dynamic strategy followed by the fund. In our framework, a
fund focusing on a particular strategy is tantamount to the fund picking its
strike price for the option. Again, our model gives rise to several implications
that are corroborated by the empirical literature. For example, consider the
lower-left panel in Figure 6.2. As mentioned earlier, the short put pay-off
pattern corresponds to a trading strategy focusing on convergence bets. Fol-
lowing our model, such a strategy is only optimal if the strike is sufficiently
low, i.e., if the put is sufficiently far out of the money. This is supported
by the findings of Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). As mentioned earlier, they
capture much of the variation in merger arbitrage returns by including a put
option. It is remarkable to note that the optimal strike price of their option
is at a return level of -4%. This resembles an out of the money put along
the lines predicted by our present simple framework. Another example is
given by the upper-left panel in Figure 6.2. Originally suggested by Merton
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(1981), Fung and Hsieh (2001) use the long straddle pay-off to describe the
returns on market timers, i.e. those traders that buy when they believe the
market goes up and sell short when they believe it going down. Our model
implies that strike prices must not be too high in order for the long straddle
to be optimal. Fung and Hsieh use at-the-money straddles in their empirical
work. Our results suggest that out-of-the-money straddles would provide an
even better fit in their regression model.
The above interpretation of the strike price as the chosen dynamic strat-
egy of the fund raises the question what type of strategy will be chosen by
investors if they can freely choose among different hedge fund styles. Extend-
ing the model (6.2) to optimize over {X0, X1} and x simultaneously leads to
the optimality of the lower-left and upper-right panels in Figure 6.2, depend-
ing on whether the surplus is negative or positive, respectively. This has two
implications. First, it may in part explain why the lower-right panel does not
match any of the well-known dynamic investment styles used in the industry.
It is simply not optimal to follow this strategy if the strategy choice is at
the discretion of the hedge fund manager or the investor. The argument is
strengthened by noting that the lower two panels describe a situation with
a negative surplus. In such a setting, an efficient choice of the asset mix in-
cluding the strike x is even more important than in a situation of a positive
surplus. This may explain why we can observe the long straddle strategy
(trend followers) empirically, while this is harder for the short straddle. Our
second implication of the optimal choice of the strike x, however, is that the
(long) straddle type pay-off patterns (upper-left panel in Figure 6.2) may not
survive in the long run, either. As investors become more aware of the funds’
properties and potential alternatives, our results suggests that they will shift
out of trend following funds into long call strategies.
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we discussed a very simple financial optimization model based
on loss aversion for which exactly four different pay-off patterns can be opti-
mal. These patterns closely match the various patterns in hedge fund returns
observed in empirical work. We provided several reasons to suspect that loss
aversion is an important phenomenon in hedge funds. The most explicit piece
of evidence given in the literature relates to incentive schemes for hedge fund
managers: the limited liability for managers is reduced by requiring them
to put a substantial amount of their own money at stake. In that sense,
loss aversion is a result of the common ‘put your money where your mouth
is’-policy that hedge funds use to attract potential investors and signal their
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commitment.
Our model provides a unified, rational framework for explaining patterns
in hedge fund returns. Using traditional utility functions that do not have
the loss aversion property, capturing the wide variety in hedge fund return
patterns into one unifying framework is much more difficult. With respect to
robustness, numerical computations reveal very similar patterns for alterna-
tive specifications for the loss averse objective function. In particular, using
the original specification of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) our findings do
not change significantly.
Interestingly, our model also gives rise to some new predictions pertaining
to the relation between the incentive schemes and adopted dynamic strate-
gies. Partial evidence supporting some of the predictions is available from
empirical work in the literature. More detailed data sets, however, are needed
to substantiate the empirical validity of some other implications of our the-
oretical model. Of course, in practice hedge fund managers may adopt a
number of trading strategies and/or change strategies over time. It is clear
that such complications fall outside the scope of our current simple modeling
framework. We believe, however, that the model and its results provide a
useful step in a further understanding of hedge funds.
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Appendix
6.A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 6.2.1
We start by restating the optimization problem in (6.2) as
max
X0,X1
V (X0, X1), (6A.1)
with V (X0, X1) = E[W1]− λ · E[(W
B −W1)
+], (6A.2)
subject to
W1 = W0rf +X0 · (u− rf ) +X1 · (Rc − c · rf). (6A.3)
Define p = x/rf + c− 1, the price of the put option corresponding to price of
the call following from put-call parity, see e.g. Hull (1997). Define Rc,x,G(·) as
the expected return on the call option with strike x on an asset with return
u ∼ G(·), given by E[(u−x)+/c]. For ease of notation, we drop the subscripts
x and G(·). Likewise, we denote the expected return on the put option with
Rp. To ensure a finite optimal solution we need the following assumptions.
A: λrfG(x) > Rc − rf ,
B: λ
∫ x
0
(x− u)+/p− rfdG > −(Rp − rf ],
C: Rc is increasing in x.
The motivation for these two assumptions will follow from the proofs below.
In short, assumptions A and B put a lower bound on the loss aversion param-
eter λ to ensure that the trade-off between risk and return leads to a finite
solution. Assumption C is tested empirically in Coval and Shumway (2001),
who find that the expected return of S&P index option returns increases with
the strike price.
There are four possible pay-off patterns resulting from the combination
of a risk-free asset, a stock, and a call option on the stock, namely decreasing-
decreasing(I), increasing-increasing(II), decreasing-increasing(III), increasing-
decreasing(IV), where for example case (I) refers to a setting where the pay-
off increases in u both before and after the strike price x.
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pattern I (decreasing-decreasing)
Conditions for case I are X0 ≤ 0 and X0+X1 ≤ 0. The first order conditions
in this case are given by
∂V
∂X0
= 0⇒ 0 = E[u− rf ] + λ
∫ ∞
u¯
u− rfdG, (6A.4)
and
∂V
∂X1
= 0⇒ 0 = E[(u− x)+ − c · rf ] + λ
∫ ∞
u¯
(u− x)+ − c · rfdG,
(6A.5)
where u¯ is a constant depending on (X0, X1). Using E[u] > rf and E[(u −
x)+] > c · rf , we obtain that the right-hand sides of both (6A.4) and (6A.5)
are positive for any value of u¯, such that there is no interior optimum. The
solution in situation I is, therefore, to set X∗0 = X
∗
1 = 0.
pattern II (increasing, increasing)
Conditions for case II are X0 > 0 and X0 +X1 > 0. First order conditions
are given by the system{
E[u− rf ] + λ
∫ u¯
0
u− rfdG = 0,
E[(u− x)+ − c · rf ] + λ
∫ u¯
0
(u− x)+ − c · rfdG = 0,
(6A.6)
where u¯ is again a constant depending on (X0, X1). Each equation in (6A.6)
has either zero or two solutions. The zero-solution case for the first order
condition corresponds to unbounded solutions for the original optimization
problem (6A.1), since the left-hand side in (6A.6) must then necessarily be
positive. We have abstracted from unbounded solutions however. Since the
integrands in the two equations of (6A.6) are different, the two equations
will not be satisfied for the same value of u¯. Hence, the optimum is attained
at the extremals. In this case, for II the extremals are defined by two sets of
parameter values, given by
X0 = 0, X1 > 0, (6A.7)
or
X0 > 0, X0 +X1 = 0. (6A.8)
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Starting with the former, investing only in the call option implies an op-
timization problem with the following first order condition for an interior
optimum:
E[(u− x)+ − c · rf ] + λ
∫ u¯
0
(u− x)+ − c · rfdG = 0, (6A.9)
where u¯ = (WB − W0rf )/X1 + x + c · rf . By definition, u¯ ≥ x. Under
assumption A, we find that the FOC is never fulfilled, i.e. the derivative
with respect to X1 is negative. Without an interior optimum, the optimal
solution is given by
X∗1 =
{
(W0 −W
B/rf)/c if W0 > W
B/rf ,
0 if W0 ≤ W
B/rf .
(6A.10)
We call this the long call strategy.
Now for the second case of extremals in situation I:
Define X2 = X0 + X1, and p = (x + c · rf − rf )/rf . Condition for an
interior optimum is
E[(x− u)+ − p · rf ] + λ
∫ u¯
0
(x− u)+ − p · rfdG = 0, (6A.11)
where u¯ = (W0rf − W
B)/X2 + x − p · rf . By definition, u¯ ≤ x. Under
assumption B, the FOC has no solution, i.e. the derivative with respect to
X2 is positive.
Without an interior optimum, the optimal solution is given by
X∗2 =
{
(WB/rf −W0)/p if W0 < W
B/rf ,
0 if W0 ≥ W
B/rf .
(6A.12)
We call this the short put strategy.
For W0 ≥ W
B/rf the long call strategy has a higher objective value than
the short put. This is seen from the objective values, which are W0rf+(W0−
WB/rf)(Rc − rf) for the long call versus the short put value of W0rf .
For W0 < W
B/rf the short put strategy has higher objective value than
the long call. This is seen from the objective values, which are W0rf + λ ·
(W0rf −W
B) for the long call versus the short put value that is larger than
W0rf+λ·(W0rf−W
B)·G(x). The last inequality follows from Assumption B.
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pattern III (decreasing-increasing: straddle)
Situation III is characterized by X0 < 0, X0 +X1 > 0.
The two values for which W1 = W
B are given by u¯1 < x and u¯2 > x.
They are defined as
u¯1 =
WB −W0 · rf −X0 · rf −X1 · c · rf
X0
(6A.13)
u¯2 =
WB −W0 · rf −X0 · rf −X1 · x−X1 · c · rf
X0 +X1
(6A.14)
The first order conditions are given by
∂V
∂X0
= E[u− rf ] + λ ·
∫ u¯2
u¯1
(u− rf )dG = 0, (6A.15)
∂V
∂X1
= E[(u− x)+ − c · rf ] + λ ·
∫ u¯2
u¯1
((u− x)+ − c · rf)dG = 0.(6A.16)
s.t. u¯1 < x < u¯2. (6A.17)
It can be checked that under the current assumptions the Hessian is negative
definite. If the FOC is fulfilled for a feasible (X0, X1), it constitutes a local
optimum. Note that if the FOC is satisfied, the value of the objective function
can be written as
W0rf +λ · rf · (W0−W
B/rf) · (G(u¯
∗
2)−G(u¯
∗
1)) ≤ W0rf +λ ·S0. (6A.18)
The function value of the optimum in situation II for positive surplus is
given by the value of the long call strategy as
W0rf +(W0−W
B/rf) ·E[(u−x)
+/c−rf ] = W0rf +S0 · [Rc−rf ]. (6A.19)
Using assumption C, which says that Rc− rf is increasing in x, we find that
for x→ 0 and S0 > 0 the straddle pay-off is better than the long call pay-off
of case II.
pattern IV (increasing, decreasing: short straddle)
Situation IV is similar to case III and characterized by X0 > 0, X0+X1 < 0.
u¯1 and u¯2 are the same as in situation III.
The first order conditions are given by
∂V
∂X0
= E[u− rf ] + λ ·
∫ u¯1
0
(u− rf )dG+ λ ·
∫ ∞
u¯2
(u− rf)dG, (6A.20)
∂V
∂X1
= E[(u− x)+ − c · rf ]
+ λ ·
∫ u¯1
0
((u− x)+ − c · rf)dG+ λ ·
∫ ∞
u¯2
((u− x)+ − c · rf)dG.(6A.21)
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For the moment, it is left as an exercise to the reader to verify that the
Hessian is negative definite. If the FOC is fulfilled for a feasible (X0, X1), it
constitutes a local optimum. Note that if the FOC is satisfied, the value of
the objective function can be written as
W0rf + λ · (W0rf −W
B) · (1− (G(u¯∗2)−G(u¯
∗
1))). (6A.22)
The function value of the optimum in situation II for negative surplus is
given by the short put strategy as
W0rf +X2 · p ·
(
E[Rp − rf ] + λ ·
∫ x
0
(x− u)+ − p · rfdG
)
+λ · (W0rf −W
B) ·G(x),
(6A.23)
which is, according to Assumption B, larger than
W0rf + λ · (W0rf −W
B) ·G(x). (6A.24)
This implies that there is a strike y such that for strikes x < y, the short
put strategy of pattern II has a higher objective value than the current short-
straddle pattern IV.
Having found the optimal pay-offs for each pair (x, S0), we end with
defining A in Theorem 6.2.1. From the definition of u¯1 and u¯2 in (6A.13)
and (6A.14) , we can write X0 and X1 as a function of u¯1 and u¯2 in the
following way:(
X0 +X1
−X0
)
=
1
A
·
(
x− u¯1
u¯2 − x
)
· S · rf , (6A.25)
where A = −(u¯2−x)(x−u¯1)+crf (x−u¯1)+(u¯2−x)prf , and prf = x+crf−rf .
As the long straddle pay-off is only optimal for positive surplus, we find
A > 0. This concludes the proof.
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7Conclusion
In the introduction we gave a definition of loss aversion from Gleitman et al.
(2000). However, we did not quote the full citation, which reads
“Loss Aversion: A widespread pattern, evident in many aspects
of decision making, in which people seem particularly sensitive
to losses and eager to avoid them. In many cases, this manifests
itself as an increased willingness to take risks in hopes of reducing
the loss.”
The second sentence of the quoted definition is the kind of behavior that
we have formally derived in Chapter 2 to be optimal under the bilinear spec-
ification of loss averse preferences. To characterize the investment behavior,
we introduced the notion of a surplus as the difference between initial wealth
and the risk-free discounted level of the benchmark wealth. For a negative
surplus, the investment in the risky asset is increasing when the surplus
becomes even more negative. For positive surpluses, the risky investment
increases with the surplus. Hence, the amount of risky investments as a
function of initial wealth takes a V-shaped form. The V-shaped patterns
also represent the solution to the multi-stage problem, where the slopes of
the V’s are decreasing in (i) the degree of loss aversion, and (ii) the time to
the horizon. The first effect is fairly trivial. However, the fraction invested
in the risky asset does not go to zero for infinite loss aversion. We concluded
that investing in the risky asset decreases the expected shortfall, regardless
of the (linear) degree of loss aversion. The second effect has specific impli-
cations in the area of time-diversification. It confirms the popular idea that
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stocks are more attractive than bonds when the planning period is longer
and preferences are loss averse.
Chapter 3 showed that the characteristic asset allocation rules of Chap-
ter 2 are robust to changes in the specification of loss aversion. We considered
two alternatives to the linear penalty on losses, a convex and a concave one.
The first was the Kahneman-Tversky value function, which plays a central
role in the behavioral finance literature. The second was an objective with
a quadratic penalty on shortfall. This specification is used in applied As-
set/Liability Management studies. Proponents argue that it punishes large
losses more severely, thus ensuring a safer investment policy. We saw that
this is indeed the case for most (though not all) surplus values, although the
V-shaped investment rules are still optimal. Moreover, despite the concavity
in losses, the fraction in the risky asset does not go to zero if the loss aver-
sion parameter goes to infinity. The results for both alternate specifications
of loss aversion suggest that in many practical and empirical situations, it
suffices to use the bilinear formulation of loss aversion.
A final consideration concerned the inclusion of restrictions on the com-
position of the asset mix, which have a dampening effect on the V-shaped
rules. This effect becomes larger for models with a longer horizon.
The results in Chapters 2 and 3 are promising: for all loss averse settings
we considered, the typical asset allocation rules have a persistent shape. In
the rest of the thesis, we set out to put the mean-shortfall model into perspec-
tive. The first application to consider was in the area of Asset/Liability Man-
agement for pension funds. We saw that the parameters of the mean-shortfall
model have a natural interpretation in terms of pension funding. This is not
surprising, since the types of models that are typically used in ALM were
the initial source of inspiration to consider the mean-shortfall model and its
solution. We considered extensions to the framework of the mean-shortfall
optimization, making the benchmark level stochastic. This increased insight
in how major economic variables impact the optimal investment strategies
for pension funds under loss averse preferences. We did not find conclusive
empirical evidence of pension funds being actually loss averters. However,
using data on funding ratios and stock allocations, we were able to point out
specific patterns that cannot be explained by ‘standard’ strategies alone. We
suggested that loss aversion may provide a possible explanation for part of
the empirical puzzle.
A natural area of application for optimal financial decision making is
the area of household consumption and investment. In Chapter 5 we inter-
preted the mean-shortfall objective as representing the per-period utility of
consumption. We derived optimal investment decision rules, and analyzed
them in the context of precautionary savings. Using the parametric solution,
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and expected shortfall as the natural risk measure, it was straightforward to
derive a relation between uncertainty and savings/investment. A very nat-
ural extension was the inclusion of habit formation. As the model has an
explicit reference point, habit formation was a natural mechanism to con-
sider, transforming the fixed benchmark level of the earlier chapters into an
endogenously determined reference point.
A final application of the mean-shortfall model was in Chapter 6. It in-
volved assumptions on the incentives of hedge fund managers, as well as the
investors. We modeled possible dynamic strategies of hedge funds by extend-
ing the framework to include a call-option on the risky asset. The optimal
pay-off patterns that emerged as part of the optimal solution matched em-
pirical patterns of pay-offs from hedge fund return factors. Until now, no
other explanation in terms of incentives or preferences was given to explain
the existence of typical nonlinear pay-off patterns for hedge funds.
Concluding, this thesis can be seen as giving an in-depth view on the
effects of loss averse preferences on financial decision making. The mean-
shortfall model was solved and interpreted, giving both analytical and nu-
merical results on optimal risk taking. We put the mean-shortfall model in
the perspective by considering three different economic settings of financial
decision making. In each setting there are numerous interesting directions
for future research, one of the most interesting being under what specific
conditions the found V-shaped behavior occurs empirically.
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